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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

THE DRIVER'S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT:
CONGRESS MAKES A WRONG TURN

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Driver's Privacy Protection Act (DPPA)' is the most recent national
encroachment upon state power to gain notoriety. Though the Constitution does not
confer a police power upon the national government, it is difficult to name any area
of local concern that has not fallen within Washington's orbit. Under the
Constitution of 1787, the national government's powers were "few and defined,"
whereas the states' powers were "numerous and indefinite."2 Even those who
favored great energy in the national government expressed bewilderment at the
notion thatthe new government would wantto oversee local matters.3 Nonetheless,
the United States today is a highly consolidated nation where innocent and
pedestrian activities are vigorously regulated by the national government. For
example, in one ofthe most egregious usurpations this century, the Supreme Court
in 1942 declared that the national government could regulate a solitary bucolic soul
raising wheat on his own farm for personal consumption.' Proponents of national
power correctly point out that section one of the Fourteenth Amendment,5 coupled
with the enforcement power of section five,' wrought a major change in our
constitutional framework.7 However, as the amendment's contemporaries noted, it

1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-25 (1994).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Bantam Books ed., 1982).
3. THm FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
4. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
1938 under the Commerce Clause).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section one states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5. Section five states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id.
7. See, e.g., JEtHRo K. LIEBERmAN, THE ENDURING CONSTITTION 154 (1987) (discussing the

expansion of national power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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was not meant to destroy the principal features of the federal system.8 In light of the
piteous condition of the states today, efforts to restore the proper balance to the
federal system are welcomed and needed.
Fortunately, some jurists still scrutinize the actions of the federal government.
On September 17, 1997, a federal district judge permanently enjoined the United
States from enforcing the Driver's Privacy Protection Act in South Carolina.9 Judge
Dennis Shedd rejected the government's claims that the DPPA was valid under the
Commerce Clause and section 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Shedd found
that the DPPA exceeded the scope of the commerce power'0 and concluded that the
information the Act sought to protect was not the type of information a person
would expect to remain confidential." This Note examines Judge Shedd's analysis
in Condon v. Reno and the prospects for the DPPA insofar as the government has
appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit. Part II explores the forces behind the
enactment ofthe DPPA and the arguments of the Act's opponents. Part III discusses
Judge Shedd's Commerce Clause and privacy analysis as well as a split in the
circuits on the privacy issue. Part IV summarizes the Note's main points and argues
for greater efforts to revive a healthy federalism.
II. BACKGROUND
The DPPA prohibits the release of personal information from state motor
vehicle records.' Enacted in 1994, the DPPA became effective on September 13,
1997, and sent the 50 states scurrying to comply with the federal law. 3 The DPPA
was enacted after Rebecca Schaeffer, the star of the television program, My Sister
Sam, was murdered by a stalker. 4 The stalker secured the address of the actress
from a private detective who had used state motor vehicle records to obtain the
information. 5 In addition to the Schaeffer murder, Congress cited other incidents

8. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 82 (1873).
9. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977 (D.S.C. 1997).
10. Id. at 986.
11.Id. at 992.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994). The DPPA defines personal information as "information that
identifies an individual, including an individual's photograph, social security number, driver
identification number, name, address (but not the 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or
disability information, but does not include information on vehicular accidents, driving violations, and
driver's status." 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (1994).
13. State Legislative Update: Driver's Privacy ProtectionAct Implementation, THE NEWs
MEDIA AND THE LAw, Summer 1997, at 34 (chronicling the compliance of all 50 states with the

DPPA).
14. 139 CONG. REC. S15,762 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer); Condon, 972
F. Supp. at 979 n.4.
15. AndreaFord, Fan ConvictedofMurderinActress'Slaying,L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30,1991, at B1.
Ironically, the DPPA provides an exception for private investigators and thus the Act, prompted by the
murderof Schaeffer, mightnothave saved the actress's life had itbeen in place. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8)
(1994).
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in support of the DPPA, including the following: thieves using license plate
numbers of luxury cars to obtain the owners' addresses,' 6 abortion protestors using
motor vehicle records to obtain addresses of patrons of abortion clinics for the
purpose of sending black balloons and pro-life literature, 7 and cases of stalking
similar to the Schaeffer incident.'8
Opponents of the Act expressed concern that the DPPA was just another
unfunded mandate that could prohibit legitimate uses of information.' 9 In
congressional testimony, members of the press pointed to the benefits of keeping
motor vehicle records open. For example, a reporter in Florida used motor vehicle
records to identify drivers with six or more DUI convictions that were still behind
the wheel.2 ° Another reporter used motor vehicle records to identify hooded
members of the Ku Klux Klan who had marched through the community.2'

Though both sides make valid points about access to motor vehicle records, one
thing is clear: the DPPA, whether constitutional or not, will have little or no effect
on unsavory individuals intent on obtaining information about their potential
victims. As media groups have observed, "Dozens ofprivate vendors operate 'look
up' services and other computerized directories containing identical information,
readily available via the Internet either free of charge or for small fees."' A sixthgrader with a PC is more of an enemy in Senator Boxer's "war" for privacy' than
individuals perusing motor vehicle records.
Specifically, the DPPA provides that "a State department of motor vehicles...
shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity
personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection
with a motor vehicle record."24 However, the DPPA provides fourteen exceptions
ranging from branches of government carrying out official functions to insurers
seeking to verify information provided by insureds.' Individuals violating the
16. 139 CONG. Rc. S15,762 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
17. Id. at S15,765 (statement of Sen. Robb).
18. Id. at S15,762 (statement of Sen. Boxer).
19. Id. at S15,763 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
20. 1994 WL 14167984, at *2 (congressional testimony of Richard A. Oppel).
21.Id.
22. CongressShould Steer Clear of State Drivers' Records, THE NEWS MEDIA AND THE LAv,
Summer 1997, at 2; see also Kathleen A. Linert, DatabaseMarketing and PersonalPrivacy in the
InformationAge, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 687, 687 (1995) (describing how any person with
a computer can explore myriad databases containing a plethora of personal information); Judith Beth
Prowda, PrivacyandSecurity ofData,64 FORDHAM L. REv. 738, 741 (1995) (noting that the sale of
personal information yields billions of dollars per year).
23. 139 CONG. REC. S15,764 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer).

24. 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (1994).
25. The DPPA provides exceptions for government agencies performing official functions, matters
relating to the safety and performance of vehicles, businesses seeking to verify personal information
submitted to them, judicial proceedings, research and statistical studies, insurance matters, notification
of owners who have had vehicles towed, private investigators, employers obtaining verification of
holders ofcommercial driver's licenses, operators of private toll booths, individuals obtaining consent
from the driver whose personal information is desired, state laws relating to safety and motor vehicles,
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DPPA face criminal fines26 and liability."
South Carolina has its own statutory scheme for regulating access to motor
vehicle records2 8 and thus protested that "[i]n enacting the DPPA, Congress has
barged... into the regulation of motor vehicle registration information, an area in
which the federal government does not participate and which it has never sought to
regulate."29 Taking its cue from the sponsors of the DPPA, the federal government
argued that the DPPA was legitimate under section 5 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment
and the Commerce Clause.30
III. ANALYSIS

A. The Commerce Clausev. the Tenth Amendment
The United States first argued that the DPPA was a proper exercise of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce." Since the watershed case of
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,32 Congress has enjoyed a virtually

and any other use provided that a driver does not opt for the protection of the DPPA. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2721(b)(l)-(14) (1994).
26. The statute provides that "[a] person who knowingly violates this chapter shall be fined under
this title." 18 U.S.C. § 2723(a) (1994).
27. The statute provides that an action may be brought in a United States district court, and the
court may award actual damages, punitive damages (if the DPPA was willfully or recklessly ignored),
attorney fees, and equitable relief if appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (1994).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3-510 to -540 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). South Carolina's statute
differs markedly from the DPPA. For example, a person requesting information contained in motor
vehicle records must submit a signed request form that includes the reason for the request, the

requester's name and address, and a statement declaring that the information will not be used for
telemarketing. S.C. CODEANN. § 56-3-510 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The department must retain the
requests for five years and must release copies of the forms to drivers that want to know who has sought
information about them. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-520 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). The South Carolina
statute also contains an opt-out provision ifdrivers do not want their personal information provided for
survey or marketing purposes. S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-3-540 ( Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
29. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 1.
30. 139 CONG. REC. S15,763 (daily ed. Nov. 16,1993) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (arguing for the
constitutionality of the Act based on privacy, and reasoning that "with mail, cars, and harassment
involved, this issue clearly has an impact on interstate commerce").
31. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress "[to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). The power to regulate commerce
could be described as one of the chief impetuses behind the adoption of the Constitution of 1787. For
example, Justice Story described the lack of a commerce power as "a leading defect of the
Confederation" and provided a vivid description of the "degraded state" ofAmerican commerce under
the Articles of Confederation. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

§ 163 (Regnery Gateway 1986) (1840). However, not everyone saw the Commerce
Clause as an improvement in the American system of government. See LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED
UNITED STATES

FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON & THE FOUNDING OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

174-75 (1995)

(describing Southern fears of a federal commerce power and proposals to require a two-thirds majority
in Congress to pass commercial regulations).
32. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that intrastate activities having a substantial relationship to
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unrestrained use of the Commerce Clause as the Court has upheld such diverse
matters as civil rights legislation33 and criminal statutes34 under the rubric of the
commerce power. However, in UnitedStates v. Lopez35 the Supreme Court hinted
that this era of Commerce Clause carte blanche might be coming to an end when
it struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act,36 which had prohibited the
possession of firearms near school premises. In Lopez the Court identified three
categories that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: (1) "the use of
the channels of interstate commerce," (2) "the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce," and (3) "activities having
'
a substantial relation to interstate commerce."37
The United States argued that
possession of a firearm in school zones could affect the functioning of the national
economy as well as hamper the education of children and thus result in an
unproductive workforce."
The Court rejected these arguments as it examined the Act under the
"substantial effect" prong of the commerce power.39 The Court found that under the
federal government's reasoning "Congress could regulate any activity that it found
was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens," including areas of
traditional state concern such as family law.4" Though the Court found Congress
to possess broad powers under the Commerce Clause, it denied the existence of a
federal police power, which would have given the Congress the authority to enact
virtually any law.4' The dissenters averred that the Court should have upheld the
Act by applying the less rigorous rational basis test42 and worried that the Court was
returning to the substantive due process ofthe Lochnerera.43 Though the dissenters
found the Court's decision to be a revolutionary departure from prior case law, the
Court intimated that had the statute included a "jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce"" and congressional findings regarding the effect of gun

interstate commerce are within Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause).
33. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding the use of the
commerce power to craft civil rights legislation).
34. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding anti-loansharking provisions of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act as a permissible use of the commerce power).
35. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
37. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
38. Id. at 563-64.

39. Id. at 567.
40. Id. at 564.
41. Id. at 566.
42. Id. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter, J., dissenting); see John A.C. Hetherington, State Economic
Regulation andSubstantive Due ProcessofLaw, 53 Nv.U. L. REV. 13 (1958) (discussing the rise and
fall of substantive due process as applied to state economic regulation).
44. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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possession in a school zone upon interstate commerce, 5 the statute might have been
viewed in a more positive light. At least one commentator has noted that, under the
standard announced in Lopez, the
Court's most expansive precedents would be
46
test.
majority's
the
under
upheld
Perhaps believing that Lopez was more bark than bite, the federal government,
in its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss in Condon v. Reno, invited
Judge Shedd to embark upon a substantial effects analysis by unequivocally stating
that "the DPPA represents a simple congressional exercise ofthe power to regulate
State activities that, in conjunction with wholly commercial enterprises,
substantiallyaffect interstate commerce."47 Judge Shedd, eschewing examination
of the DPPA through the uncertain lens of Lopez, proceeded down another path.48
For Judge Shedd, the Tenth Amendment49 proved to be much steadier ground
upon which to base his decision. But before beginning his analysis, Judge Shedd
had to choose between two lines of cases applying the Tenth Amendment: the
Garciabranch (as urged by the United States) and the New York v. United States"0
branch (as urged by South Carolina). In examining the DPPA in light of the Tenth
Amendment Judge Shedd was revisiting perhaps our oldest constitutional
question."'
1.

The Garcia Line of Cases

In Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthori5 the Court overruled
45. Id. at 562.

46. Eric W. Hagen, Note, United States v. Lopez: Artificial Respiration for the Tenth
Amendment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363, 1388 n.209 (1996). Moreover, in concurrence, Justice Thomas
went so far as to describe the substantial effect test as giving Congress a general "'police power' over
all aspects of American life." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
47. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 15 (emphasis added).
48. Judge Shedd made only a passing reference to Lopez in a footnote when he acknowledged
South Carolina's comparison of the DPPA to the Gun-Free School Zones Act. Condon v. Reno, 972
F. Supp. 977, 982 n.15 (D.S.C. 1997).
49. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id.
50. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
51. In 1791 President Washington, while considering the incorporation of the Bank of the United
States, asked the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, and the Secretary of State, Thomas
Jefferson, for opinions concerning the constitutionality ofthe creation of the Bank. Jefferson began by
quoting the Tenth Amendment and describing it as the "foundation of the Constitution." Jefferson
versus Hamilton on the Bank of the United States 1791, in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERiALS 105, 105 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1991). He argued that the enumerated powers did not
contemplate the incorporation of a bank, and with great angst described the possibility of Congress
seizing "possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition." Id.
Hamilton, on the other hand, rested his argument for the Bank on implied powers, considering them
"delegated equally with express ones."Id. at 106. If the ends could be found in the enumerated powers,
Hamilton argued, the means were within the power of the national government. Id. at 107.
52. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol49/iss5/7
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NationalLeague ofCitiesv. Usery 3 and held that the minimum wage and overtime
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to state and municipal
employees. 4 The Court found "unworkable" the standard of NationalLeague of
Citiesthat centered on whether a government function was integral or traditional."5
In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun advised the states to look
to "[t]he political process" when faced with unwanted federal burdens rather than
looking to the Court to restrict the exercise of the commerce power.5 6 Justice
Blackmun's recommendation has been criticized by scholars as "abdicat[ing]
Supreme Court review of a fundamental constitutional principle, the division of
powers between the states and federal government.""
Judge Shedd also discussed South Carolina v. Baker s and EEOC v.
Wyoming. 9 InEEOCv. Wyoming, a pre-Garciacase, the Supreme Court dealt with
the congressional extension to state and local governments of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).' A Wyoming statute required
employer approval for continued employment of game and fish wardens who were
age fifty-five years or older.6 A game warden brought suit and the Supreme Court
ultimately decided that the ADEA did not handicap Wyoming's indispensable and

53. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia,469 U.S. at 557. Both Garcia and National
League of Cities were hotly debated by the Court and resulted in 5-4 decisions. NationalLeague of
Cites attempted to put "States as States ... on a quite different footing from an individual or a
corporation when challenging the exercise of Congress'[s] power to regulate commerce." National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854. In concluding its opinion, the Court forcefully stated that "Congress
may not exercise [the commerce] power so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how
essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made." Id. at 855.
One commentator has described NationalLeague of Cities as "largely responsible for the rebirth of
modem Tenth Amendment jurisprudence." John ILVile, Truism, Tautology or Vital Principle?The
Tenth Amendment Since United States v. Darby, 27 CuMB. L. Rv.445, 487 (1997).
54. Garcia,469 U.S. at 557.
55. Id. at 546.
56. Id. at 556.
57. David N. Mayer, Justice ClarenceThomas andtheSupreme Court'sRediscoveryoftheTenth
Amendment, 25 CAP.U. L. REv. 339,389 (1996); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates,
Hidden Taxation,and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice,PublicInterest,andPublicServices,
46 VAND. L. Rv.1355, 1411 (1993) (describing the Court's assertion about states relying on the
political process as "naive"). But see Thomas H. Odom, The Tenth AmendmentAfter Garcia: ProcessBased ProceduralProtections,135 U. PA. L. REv. 1657, 1663 & n.35 (1987) (pointing out that the
Court in Garciadoes not declare the political process to be the sole restraint upon the exercise of
congressional power). The greatest political theorists in this country have realized that something more
than the political process is needed to check power. John C. Calhoun criticized reasoning similar to
Blackmun's as "why so few attempts to form constitutional governments have succeeded; and why, of
the few which have, so small a number have had durable existence." JOHN C. CALHOUN, On
Government and the ConcurrentMajority, in THE ESSENTIAL CALHOUN 1, 9 (Clyde N. Wilson ed.,

1992).
58. 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
59. 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
60. Id. at 229.
61.Id. at 234.
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traditional government functions. "2 In a very strong dissent, Chief Justice Burger
reminded the majority that the Tenth Amendment had not been repealed upon
ratification ofthe Fourteenth Amendment.63 The Chief Justice emphasized that the
a Procrustean
Constitution does not permit "Congress to force the states into '64
conditions.
and
needs
local
of
account
national mold that takes no
In South Carolinav. Baker the Court dealt with Congress's removal of "the
federal income tax exemption for interest earned on publicly offered long-term
bonds issued by state and local governments unless those bonds are issued in
registered form."65 In examining South Carolina's challenge to this act, the Court
echoed Garciaby noting that the state had not alleged deprivation of political
participation.' So long as the political process operates in a proper manner, "the
Tenth, Amendment is not implicated."'67 Interestingly, in its discussion of the
political process, the Court cited the famous footnote four of United States v.
CaroleneProducts Co."8 The footnote seems to stand for an opposite proposition
because it recognizes that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."69 Arguably, the states now face
great national prejudice against them insofar as the puissant national government
has expanded its reach into areas of local concern because of lack of confidence in
local solutions." Thus, like minorities in need of protection from a majority that
sees them as inferior, the states also need protection from the national government.7
Perhaps in speaking to this very point, in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
interpreted Garcia as rejecting the assertion that the political process is the only
recourse for the states to pursue.72
2. The New York v. United States Line of Cases
New York v. UnitedStates dealt with the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy

62. Id. at 239.
63. Id. at 259 (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
64. Id. at 265.
65. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 507-08 (1988).
66.Id. at 513.
67. Id.
68. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
69. Id.
70. The criminal statute at issue in Lopez is an excellent example. The accused in Lopez was
originally charged with violating Texas law, but the state charges were dismissed once federal agents
charged Lopez with violating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551 (1995). Clearly, the states did not need federal assistance in this matter.
71. For an in-depth proposal for basing Tenth Amendment jurisprudence on Carolene Products,
see Zelinsky, supranote 57.
72. Baker, 485 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Amendments Act of 1985,"3 in which Congress sought to force the states to make
appropriate arrangements for the disposal of waste generated. One incentive found
in the Act required the states to take title to radioactive waste generated within their
borders if they did not arrange for waste disposal.74 Finding that the "take title"
incentive commandeered the state legislative process, the Court forcefully stated
that Congress "may not conscript state governments as its agents."" After
examining the debates around the adoption of the Constitution of 1787, the Court
concluded that in creating a more energetic central government, "the Framers
explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate
individuals, not States. 76 Moreover, the Court refused to apply the Garcialine of
cases insofar as New York v. UnitedStates was "not a case in which Congress has
subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties.""
The manner in which the Court approached the case is also particularly
relevant. The Court stated that the case could be considered in one of two ways:
The Court could inquire whether Congress's delegated powers authorized the
legislation, or it could examine the statute through the lens of the Tenth
Amendment. 8 Justice O'Connor noted that
just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference
whether one views the question at issue in these cases as one of
ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal
Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution
or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States
under the Tenth Amendment.79
Despite stating that the Tenth Amendment "is essentially a tautology,""0 the Court
treated the Tenth Amendment as a restraint on Congress rather than "merely

73.42 U.S.C. § 2021e (1994).

74. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C).
75. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
76. Id. at 166; see also THE FEDERALIST Nos. 15, 16 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining how the
power of the general government will extend to individuals and describing the alternative of merely
commanding the states as ineffectual).

77. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 160.
78. Id. at 155.
79. Id. at 159. In eschewing a Lopez-type analysis, Judge Shedd quoted at length Justice
O'Connor's analogy of the cup being half empty or half full. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 982
n. 17 (D.S.C. 1997). Though logic dictates that the same result should be reached under either approach
(Commerce Clause or Tenth Amendment analysis), the Court has not fully developed Lopez as it has
New York v. United States and its progeny. As a result, one could easily see this case coming out
differently (and perhaps overturned on review) ifLopez is developed to confer a general police power
on the federal government as Justice Thomas so persuasively argued in Lopez. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). But Judge Shedd assiduously avoided this
possibility by viewing his cup as half full.
80. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157.
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declaratory" as some respected scholars have suggested."'
Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, suggested that the
Garcia line of cases should be applied even if the cases "do not involve a
congressional law generally applicable to both States and private parties."82 Justice
White also found the Court's discussion of federalism "hollow" when decisive
action was needed to solve the nationwide problem of radioactive waste. 3 Justice
Stevens vigorously attacked the Court's claim that the national government may act
only against individuals rather than states."4 He argued that the majority's
interpretation of history and the Constitution unnaturally reduced the power of the
federal government."5 Moreover, Justice Stevens also averred that the Tenth
Amendment posed no limits on the exercise of congressional power.86
Next in the Tenth Amendment analysis, Judge Shedd turned to Printzv. United
States,8" which had been decided just two months before the district court issued its
opinion. Printz concerned an interim provision of the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act88 requiring chief law enforcement officers of local jurisdictions to
"conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers and to perform
certain related tasks" until the national government established an instant
background check system. 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, began by
examining early statutes to see if they compelled state officials to manage federal
programs and concluded the Framers presumed they had no such power over the
states.9" After a lengthy discussion of The Federalist,Justice Scalia described the
American system of dual sovereignty: "Residual state sovereignty was also
implicit, of course, in the Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all
governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones... which implication
was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's" guarantee. 9' As Justice
O'Connor refused to do in New York v. UnitedStates, Justice Scalia did not apply
Garcia because the issue before the Court did not concern "the incidental

81.CompareWalterBems,The Meaning ofthe TenthAmendment, in TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
SERIOUSLY 162, 170 (Gary L. McDowell ed., 1981) (arguing the Tenth Amendment is clearly
declaratory), with RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 81 (1987) (contending that
dismissing "the Tenth Amendment as merely 'declaratory' is likewise to vitiate the supremacy clause
and the necessary and proper clause").
82. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 205 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Interestingly, pre-New Yorkv. UnitedStates commentators described Garciaas applying "only
to federal statutes that directly regulate the states." Odom, supra note 57, at 1662.
83. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 207 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
84. Id. at 210 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id.
86.Id.at 211.

87. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(1) (1994).
89. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2368.
90. Id. at 2371.
91. Id. at 2376-77.
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application to the States of a federal law of general applicability" disrupting state
functions.9 2 In the end, the Court quoted New York v. UnitedStates and affirmed
that requiring state and local law enforcement officers to perform background
checks ran afoul of the principle that the federal government may not
constitutionally force the states to regulate or administer a scheme of federal
regulations.93
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas, as he did in Lopez, encouraged the
Court to reevaluate its commerce clause jurisprudence and questioned whether
Congress could regulate firearm possession under the Brady law.94 By reading the
Second Amendment as a personal guarantee to bear arms, Justice Thomas
postulated that the federal government could no more prohibit firearm possession
than it could regulate the exercise of religion under the First Amendment.'
The dissent appealed once again to Garcia,stating that Justice Scalia "points
to nothing suggesting that the political safeguards of federalism . . . need be
supplemented." 96 The dissents also accused the majority of relying on mere dicta97
found in New York v. United States and asserted that Congress "may require the
States to implement its programs" under certain circumstances.9"

3. Judge Shedd ChoosesNew York v. United States
Thus, in light ofthe Garciaand New Yorkv. UnitedStates lines of cases, Judge
Shedd had to decide whether the DPPA subjected states to the same legislation
applicable to private parties (Garcia),or whether the DPPA compelled the states
to enact or administer a federal regulatory program (New York v. United States).
The United States argued that "in the DPPA Congress has directly regulated
individuals' use ofpersonal information. It has not enlisted the States to do that job
for it."' Moreover, in distinguishing Printz, the federal government alleged that the
DPPA does not "conscript state officers," but instead "directly regulates the buyers
and sellers, or disclosers and recipients, of private information. ''""m South Carolina,
on the other hand, described the federal government's interpretation of the DPPA
as "simply literally incorrect"''" and pointed out that a person requesting records
from the State department of motor vehicles "is clearly having his access to the

92. Id. at 2383.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
95. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2385-86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 2395 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
97. Id. at 2398.
98. Id. at 2396-97.
99. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 16.
100. Defendants' Supplemental Brief Discussing the Applicability vel non of Printz v. United
States at 5.
101. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 8.
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records 'regulated' by the State pursuant to a Congressional directive."', 2 As for
Printz, South Carolina described the case as taking "the highly-probable
unconstitutionality of the DPPA and ma[king] it a certainty."' 3

At this stage of the battle,'04 even the most neutral observer could see that the
federal government, in circling its wagons around Garcia,was preparing for an
reenactment of Little Bighorn. The DPPA's title gave away the Act's true nature:
"Prohibition on Release and Use of Certain Personal Information from State Motor
Vehicle Records."'0 5 The DPPA is not a statute prohibiting private persons from
disclosing information and applying the same prohibition to the states. Nor does the
DPPA regulate the many private companies that routinely buy and sell personal
information for direct marketing and other purposes. The DPPA's title and its
provisions are clearly aimed at the states-and the states alone. Moreover, the
federal government's attempt to limit New York v. United States to instances in
which the states are required "to regulate the behavior of their citizens"'0 6 was but
a feeble effort to cause Judge Shedd to err. Judge Shedd wasted little time in
pointing out that the Supreme Court had "in no way limited its holding" in New
Yorkv. UnitedStates as claimed by the federal government.' 7 Thus, in light of the
Supreme Court's unequivocal characterization of Garcia,Judge Shedd based his
analysis on the New York v. UnitedStates line of cases.'
After summarizing the principles of New York v. United States and Printz,
Judge Shedd moved to the heart of the DPPA:
In enacting the DPPA, Congress has chosen not to assume responsibility
directly for the dissemination and use of these motor vehicle records.
Instead, Congress has commanded the States to implement federal policy
by requiring them to regulate the dissemination and use of these records.
In order to comply with Congress' [s] directive, the States are forced by the
threat of administrative penalty (and indirectly by civil and criminal
sanction) to take measures to prohibit access by their citizens to the motor
vehicle records. This command clearly runs afoul of the holdings of New
York and Printz.'°9

102.Id.at9.
103. State's Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Printzv. United States at 6.
104. "Battle" is indeed an appropriate description for recent cases concerning federalism. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor described the Court's conclusion that states must resort to the political process to
protect their interest as "survey[ing] the battle scene of federalism and sound[ing] a retreat." Id. The
Justice would have preferred "at the very least, [to] render a little aid to the wounded." Id.
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994).
106. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 985 (D.S.C. 1997).
107. Id
108. Id. at 986.
109. Id. at 984-85.
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Unable to reconcile the DPPA with the Tenth Amendment and recent Supreme
Court opinions, Judge Shedd rejected "the Commerce Clause as a basis for
justifying the constitutionality of the DPPA.""
Judge Shedd's Tenth Amendment analysis should be easily upheld on review.
Not only does it reach the only logical result in light of the case law, but it also does
not run afoul of the Supreme Court's recent exploration of "first principles.'
Contemporary invocations of first principles go to the heart of federal and state
relations. According to James Madison:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The
different governments will controul each other; at the same time that each
will be controuled by itself."'
Clearly, the New York v. UnitedStates and Printz majorities saw the division
of power between the states and the national government as approaching a point
when the states would be little more than pawns in the game of governance. As
Justice O'Connor stated in New York v. United States, the "States are not mere
political subdivisions of the United States. State governments are neither regional
offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal Government.".. The opponents
of the Constitution of 1787 feared such a degradation of the States."'
The ill-fated NationalLeague of Cities decision, the first modem decision to

110. Id. at 986.
111. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("I start with some first principles."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995)
("We start with first principles."). The "first principles" approach recognizes that the Framers did not
intend to create an omnipotent central government, but instead created a federal republic in which the
central government was the agent of its creator (the states), rather than the master.
112. THEFEDERALISTNo. 51, at264 (James Madison) (Bantam Books ed., 1982); see alsoLopez,
514 U.S. at 552 ("This constitutionally mandated division of authority 'was adopted by the Framers to
ensure [the] protection of our fundamental liberties."' (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458
(1991) (upholding mandatory retirement for state judges at age 70))).
113. NewYorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
114. See, e.g., The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of
Pennsylvania to their Constituents (December 18, 1787), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE
CONsTrrTmONAl. CONVENTiON DEBATES 237, 242 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). According to the
delegates:

We dissent... because the powers vested in Congress by this constitution, must
necessarily annihilate and absorb the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
of the several states, and produce from their ruins one consolidated government,
which from the nature of things will be an iron handed despotism, as nothing
short of the supremacy of despotic sway could connect and govern these United
States under one government.
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recognize the feeble position of the states in the federal system, "attempted to

resurrect the Tenth Amendment by tying it to more general federalism principles
and using it as a source of implied limitations on federal powers.""' Though
National League of Cities was short-lived," 6 Justice O'Connor and then-Justice
Rehnquist, dissenting in Garcia,predicted the principles of NationalLeague of
Cities would one day return to the field of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence." 7
Though not expressly overruling Garcia,the New York v. United States line of
cases and invocations offirst principles have fulfilled the Justices' predictions. The
Court once again seems to take seriously the necessity of a healthy federalism,

which in turn secures individual liberties."
B. The Right to Privacy
Next, the federal government turned to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment," 9 contending that "[t]he DPPA enforces a right to privacy, which has
been held to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."' 20 Though the
Constitution does not speak to a general right to privacy,' the Supreme Court in
1965 discovered its existence in Griswold v. Connecticut.' Griswold dealt with
a Connecticut statute banning the use and distribution of contraceptives." In
striking down the law as unconstitutional, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
based the decision on "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights hav[ing]
penumbras,'24 formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life

115. Vile, supranote 53, at 489.
116. See supranote 53.
117. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. Compare FELIX MORLEY, FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM 5 (1981) (postulating that freedom
and order are not mutually exclusive under a federal system), with Martin S. Flaherty, More Apparent
ThanReal: The RevolutionaryCommitment to ConstitutionalFederalism,45 KAN. L. REV. 993, 995
(1997) (contending that federalism was never seen as the primary device for protecting liberty).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
120. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 21.
121. For one of the earliest discussions of the "right to privacy," see Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) (arguing for actions in tort for
invasions of personal privacy).
122. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
123. Id. at 480.
124. "Penumbra" is defined as "the partial or imperfect shadow outside the complete shadow of
an opaque body, as a planet, where the light from the source of illumination is only partly cut off." THE
RANDOM HOUSEDICTnONARY OFTHEENGLISHLANGUAGE 1068 (1973). A "penumbra" is a seemingly
strange place to discover constitutional guarantees. For an informative discussion of the term
"penumbra" and the term's use in pre-Griswoldcases,see Henry T. Greely, A Footnoteto "Penumbra"
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 6 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 (1989).
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and substance. ''""s Using the penumbras of the First,'26 Third,' 27 Fourth, 28 Fifth,' 29
and Ninth Amendments,' the Court concluded that married couples surely had a
constitutional right to make personal choices about their intimate relations.'31
Justices Black and Stewart entered forceful dissents, accusing the majority of
Lochnerism and emphasizing that the Constitution contains no provisions
authorizing the Court to pass upon the wisdom of duly enacted laws.' 32 Other
commentators have echoed these views and severely criticized the Court's
decision.'
As one legal scholar has noted, the laws struck down in the aftermath of
Griswold "had a peculiar tendency to gravitate around sexuality: the
groundbreaking cases involved contraception, marriage, and abortion."' 34 However,
in 1977 another branch of the privacy doctrine appeared to sprout from the Supreme

125. Griswold,381 U.S. at 484.
126. The First Amendment provides that"Congress shall make no lawrespecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom ofspeech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
127. The Third Amendment states that "[n]o Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. mII.
128. The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

againstunreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
129. The Fifth Amendment provides that
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
awitness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
130. The Ninth Amendment states that "[tlhe enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,

shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
131. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The concurring justices would have
approached the matter differently. Justice Goldberg preferred to rely on the Ninth Amendment, id. at
499 (Goldberg, J., concurring), whereas Justices White and Harlan preferred the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring).
dissenting).
132. Id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J.,
133. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Griswold v. Connecticut: WaywardDecision-makingin the Supreme
Court, 16 OHiO N.U. L. Rnv. 551, 554 (1989) (describing the Court's reasoning as "utterly
incomprehensible").
134. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. Rev. 737, 738 (1989). Rubenfeld also
provides an informative and pithy discussion of the Supreme Court's privacy cases. See id. at 744-50.
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Court's decision in Whalen v. Roe.'35 Whalen dealt with aNew York law classifying
dangerous but lawful drugs. 6 The statute required the recording of prescriptions
for certain drugs on an official form, one copy of which was sent to the New York
State Department of Health where the state recorded the names and addresses of

patients receiving the drugs.'37

The district court enjoined the reporting

requirements of the statute, finding that constitutional zones of privacy protected
patients' relationships with their physicians.' The Supreme Court reversed the
decision holding that "this record does not establish an invasion of any right or
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."''39 Yet, in dicta, the Court
recognized two branches privacy: "One is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure ofpersonal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions."' 40 Towards the end of the opinion, the Court
underscored that it did not "decide any question which might be presented by the
unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data."''
Four months later the Court again encountered the disclosure of personal
matters in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.'42 Nixon concemed the
Presidential Recording and Materials Preservation Act, 14 3 which provided for an
archivist to screen former President Nixon's tapes and materials, removing personal
items and preserving materials of historical importance for possible use in judicial
proceedings.' Nixon attacked the Act alleging, inter alia,that it violated his right
to privacy."' While recognizing that Nixon had "a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his personal communications"' 46 and citing the Whalen dicta for
recognition of the nondisclosure branch of privacy, the Court balanced Nixon's
interest against his status as a public figure, the public interest and the hardship
associated in removing the few truly private materials.' 47 As a result of this
balancing, the Court rejected Nixon's privacy argument.
In examining the DPPA from the perspective of privacy, Judge Shedd rejected
South Carolina's assertion that the Supreme Court has never recognized a
constitutional right of nondisclosure of information insofar as he was bound by
Fourth Circuit precedents.' Judge Shedd identified three cases in which "the

135. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
136. Id. at 592.
137. Id. at 592-93.
138. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
139. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 606.
140. Id. at 599-600.
141. Id. at 605-06.
142.433 U.S. 425 (1977).
143.44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994).
144. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 429.
145. Id. at 455.
146. Id. at 465.

147. Id.
148. Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977, 987 (D.S.C. 1997).
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Fourth Circuit has expressly accepted that Whalen establishes such a right."' 49
1.

The Fourth CircuitandPrivacy

The first case Judge Shedd discussed was Taylor v. Best.5 ' Taylor concerned
a § 1983 action brought against prison officials for disciplinary measures resulting
from an inmate's refusal to answer questions about his family in a routine initial
screening.'' In recognizing the nondisclosure branch of the right to privacy, the
Fourth Circuit nonetheless concluded that "the compelling public interests in
assuring the security of prisons and in effective rehabilitation clearly outweigh
Taylor's interest in maintaining the confidentiality of his family background."' 52
The next case Judge Shedd surveyed was Walls v. City ofPetersburg."' Walls
was also a § 1983 claim and involved the discharge of an employee who refused to
answer a background questionnaire.' 54 The questions involved homosexual
relations, marital history, arrests or convictions of family members, and financial
information.55 The Fourth Circuit found that none of the questions violated Walls's
right to privacy.'56 First, because the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick"7 did
not construe the Constitution "to confer a right of privacy that extends to
homosexual sodomy,"' 58 Walls had no right to keep such information private.'59 As
for marital history and family criminal activity, the Fourth Circuit found that these
details were part of the public record and thus Walls had no reasonable expectation
of privacy.16 Finally, the court found that the financial information was protected
by the right to privacy.1" However, the question could rightly be asked because the
City demonstrated a "compelling interest" in this information arising from the

significant responsibilities of Walls's position. 62
Lastly, Judge Shedd considered Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross63In Watson
a mother brought a wrongful death action against the Red Cross and the hospital at
which her infant contracted AIDS from ablood transfusion."6 During discovery the
mother sought the identity of the HIV-positive donor and the magistrate

149. Id.
150. 746 F.2d 220 (4th Cir. 1984).

151. Id. at 221.
152. Id. at 225.
153. 895 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1990)
154. Id. at 190.
155. Id. at 193-94.
156. Id.
157. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
158. Id at 190.
159. Walls, 895 F.2d at 193.
160. Id. at 193-94.
161. Id. at 194.
162. Id.
163. 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992).
164. Id. at 483.
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"recommended that the donor's identity be divulged to the court and that a lawyer
be appointed to represent the donor's interests."'65 A district court affirmed the
magistrate 6 s and the Red Cross took an interlocutory appeal.' 67 In assessing the
privacy arguments, the Fourth Circuit found the possibility of public disclosure to
be remote, and held that "[t]he potential for disclosure does not rise to the level of
a violation of the privacy rights of the donor."' 68 Interestingly, in a footnote, the
Fourth Circuit expressly reserved for a future decision "the question of whether
court-approved disclosure to a larger universe might violate the donor's privacy
rights." 169 -

2. Judge Shedd Applies the Law of the Fourth Circuit
In construing the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit's privacy decisions, Judge
Shedd found it beyond doubt that the Fourth Circuit has recognized a privacy right
in the nondisclosure of certain types of personal information.'
However, he
observed that "neither Whalen, Taylor, Walls, nor Watson involved the precise issue
presented here" because those cases concerned individuals supplying information
to the government, not the disseminationofprivate information.'' Moreover, the
federal government did not and could not produce one case from the Supreme Court
or Fourth Circuit finding a violation of privacy based on government dissemination
of private information.
Sailing in uncharted waters, Judge Shedd crafted a three-prong balancing test
"between the individual's privacy right and the govermnent's need for
disclosure."' 73 First, the court must inspect the information in question to discern
whether a person would expect it to remain confidential.7 Second, the court
should balance the state's interest in obtaining the information against the
individual's privacy interest. 7 ' Finally, the court should decide whether the state's
interest in public dissemination "outweighs the individual's privacy interest.', 76
Using the first prong ofthe test, Judge Shedd impaled the DPPA. Citing Walls,
Judge Shedd noted that information which is ofpublic record is not within the right

165. Id. at 484.
166. Watson v. Medical Univ. of South Carolina, No. 9:88-2844-18, 1991 WL 406979, at *7
(D.S.C. Feb. 7, 1991) (unpublished opinion).
167. Watson, 974 F.2d at 484.
168. Id. at 488.
169. Id. at 488 n.9.
170. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 989 (D.S.C. 1997).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 990.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Condon, 972 F. Supp at 990.
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to privacy."" Judge Shedd emphasized that because the DPPA's definition of
personal information"' was "extremely broad," virtually all information in the
motor vehicle records "would have to be considered, automatically,as being within
the constitutional right to privacy."' 79 Judge Shedd then noted that such a
formulation in no way could be squared with the rule in Walls that information
procurable in the public record is unprotected by the Constitution.' 80 Looking to see
whether any of the personal information defined in the DPPA was constitutionally
protected, Judge Shedd quickly dispensed with name, address, and so forth, and
moved onto medical information.'8 ' Though finding that some medical information
was entitled to protection, the DPPA's broad inclusion of items such as an
82
individual's use of eyeglasses made the provision "practically unworkable."'
Judge Shedd did not decide whether social security numbers were within the right
to privacy, because he concluded that keeping this one category would not permit
the DPPA to function as Congress intended.'
On review, Judge Shedd's privacy analysis, like his Tenth Amendment analysis,
should be upheld by the Fourth Circuit. Unless the Circuit overrules Walls's broad
view of information obtainable in the public record, Judge Shedd's ultimate
conclusions on privacy are unassailable. Moreover, as is the usual pattern in this
type of case, the Fourth Circuit will likely acknowledge the right to privacy, but
84
ultimately find that the intrusion or action in question does not violate the right.'
But if the Fourth Circuit reverses Judge Shedd and thus expands the right to
privacy, the Supreme Court's reaction to this enlargement of Whalen will be
interesting. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Whalen expressly reserved
any question revolving around the disclosure of private information.' 5 In creating
a right to nondisclosure of information, the Fourth Circuit, like many of its sister
circuits, has stretched the essential holding of Whalen. Also, the circuits are split on
this matter and conflicting case law is developing.
3. A Split in the Circuits
Two circuit courts have questioned the existence of a constitutional right of
privacy in the nondisclosure of information. In J.P.v. DeSanti'8 6 the Sixth Circuit
confronted the nondisclosure branch of privacy in a suit brought by juveniles
seeking to enjoin the dissemination by state officials of the juveniles' social

177. Id.
178. For the DPPA's definition of personal information, see 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (1994).
179. Condon, 972 F. Supp. at 991.
180. Id.

181. Id.
182. Id. at 992.

183. Id.
184. See supraPart III.B.1.
185. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977).
186. 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
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histories.'87 Probation officers regularly compiled information about the plaintiffs

from a number of sources including school records, court records, family members,
and those filing complaints against the juveniles.'88 The probation officers
frequently supplied juvenile courtjudges with the histories prior to the adjudication
of cases against the juveniles.'89 Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v.
Davis,"9 the Sixth Circuit refused to "construe isolated statements in Whalen and

Nixon more broadly than their context allows" to discover a constitutional right of
nondisclosure. 9' The Sixth Circuit perspicuously reasoned that it is inappropriate
for the judiciary to infer sweeping constitutional rights when the document itself is
silent. 92 When courts do commandeer the legislative process in the face of a silent
Constitution, this can only lead to the atrophy of the democratic elements of society
as the people and their representatives look to the "Guardians" to make decisions
for them. 3
Just last year the D.C. Circuit applauded the Sixth Circuit's stand on
nondisclosure. In American Federationof Government Employees v. Department
of HUD"94
' employees of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) and the Department ofDefense (DOD) brought suit to stop the departments
from garnering information about their drug use and financial situation.' Though
the D.C. Circuit expressed "grave doubts as to the existence of a constitutional right
of privacy in the nondisclosure of personal information,"'96 the court did not need
to accept or reject a constitutional right to nondisclosure"9 because DOD and HUD

187. Id. at 1082.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Davis concerned a flyer, identifying active shoplifters, distributed to
area merchants by the Louisville chief of police. Id. at 695. Davis's picture was on the flyer even
though at the time it was distributed he had not been convicted. Id. at 696. Not long after distribution
of the flyer, the charges against Davis were dismissed. Id. Davis brought suit and alleged, interalia,
that his privacy was violated by the disclosure vis-A-vis the police flyer. Id. at 712. In less than one full
page, the Court examined the privacy claim and dismissed it as much different from earlier privacy
decisions. Id.at 713. As for nondisclosure, the Court declared that "[n]one of our substantive privacy
decisions hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this manner." Id.
191. DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1089.
192. Id. at 1090.
193. Judge Learned Hand said it best:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy ofPlatonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in
charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have, at least
theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs. Of course I know how
illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything; but nevertheless
when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in
a common venture.
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958).
194. 118 F.3d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
195. Id. at 787-88.
196. Id. at 791.

197. Id. at 793.
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were merely gathering, rather than disclosing, information. 98 However, the D.C.
Circuit quoted at length and approvingly from the DeSanti opinion and intimated
that if and when it must directly address nondisclosure of information, it would
reject the right.'"
Other circuits have employed reasoning similar to the Fourth Circuit. For
example, the Third Circuit in United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp."
confronted a demand from the Director of the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) that Westinghouse release medical records of certain
employees believed to be suffering from allergic reactions.2"' After quoting the
Whalen dicta on nondisclosure, the Third Circuit concluded that employee medical
records fell within the sphere of privacy. 2 However, after balancing the public
interest in the NIOSH investigations and the employees' privacy interests, the Third
Circuit concluded that the importance of NIOSH's operations warranted a minor
intrusion into the medical records.0 3 A majority ofthe circuits have recognized this
nondisclosure prong of privacy.2
When the Supreme Court revisits the privacy question, it is likely to rein in the
federal appellate courts, which, like the Fourth Circuit, have expanded on the
Whalen dicta.0 ' Key to the Supreme Court's effort will be the pre-Whalen case of
Paul v. Davis,2" a case given short shrift by Judge Shedd in a footnote as "not
particularly pertinent."' ' Though the Supreme Court has had ample opportunity to

198. Id.
199. Id. at 792-93.
200. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
201. Id.at 572.

202. Id. at 577.
203. Id. at 580.
204. Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a right of
confidentiality and stating that a violation will be found only when the information disclosed is a
"shocking degradation or an egregious humiliation"); James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1544
(IIth Cir. 1991) (recognizing a constitutional right of nondisclosure when a state official promises
confidentiality); Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that medical
information falls within the nondisclosure branch of privacy and can only be infringed if the
governmental interest is appropriate), vacatedsub nom. Reno v. Doe, 116 S. Ct. 2543 (1996); Daury
v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the nondisclosure branch of privacy); Pesce
v. J. Sterling Morton High Sch., Dist. 201, 830 F.2d 789, 795-97 (7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the
constitutional right of confidentiality, but concluding that the state law requiring a school psychologist
promptly to report child abuse did not violate the right); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.
1986) (asserting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses state possession
of certain information, which can only be disclosed if the state has a compelling interest); Barry v. City
ofNew York, 712 F.2d 1554 (2d Cir. 1983) (admitting the right to confidentiality but finding that the
statute's financial disclosure requirements did not violate the right); Plantev. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119,
1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1978) (identifying right to confidentiality but upholding financial disclosure
requirements for elected officials).
205. Cf.Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacyin the Rehnquist Court, 22
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 825 (1989) (criticizing the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
206. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
207. Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 989 n.23 (D.S.C. 1997).
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reverse Davis's conclusion °s that the right of privacy should not be enlarged to
encompass nondisclosure, it has not done so. Moreover, just one year after Davis,
Whalen was decided. The Court's language in Whalen, 9 clearly indicating that it
was not dealing with the nondisclosure of information, leftDavis completely intact.
As recently as 1997, the highly influential D.C. Circuit, in expressing "grave doubts
as to the existence of a constitutional right of privacy in the nondisclosure of
personal information,"2"' cited Davis in its opinion.2" ' When the Supreme Court
does revisit the nondisclosure question, Davis should form the core of its opinion
as it refuses to create a new right not mentioned in the text of the Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION

If the Framers of the Constitution could return to the United States of 1998,
they would think that we have abandoned their scheme of government in favor of
the British model. The national government of limited powers and the federalist
pillar"' of the American experiment are difficult to discern. The powers of the
United States Congress resemble the British Parliament insofar as Congress

208. Davis, 424 U.S. at 713.
209. The Court stated: "We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might be
presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private data-whether intentional or
unintentional-or by a system that did not contain comparable security provisions." Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977).
210. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Department of HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
211. Id. at 794.
212. Federalism is key to our republican form of government for a variety of reasons. First, in a
nation that spans a continent there is a great divergence in local circumstances. One-size-fits-all
remedies often prove awkward at best and disastrous at worst. Water law is a prime example. In the
East, the law developed so that a riparian owner had the right to use water so long as the owner did not
interfere with the same right of other riparian owners. In the West, water was scarce and a doctrine of
"first in time" developed. See JESSE DKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY 40-41 (3d. ed. 1993).
A national water law forcing a version of either the Eastern or Western models on the entire nation
would have only caused sundry problems and stifled economic growth as the United States developed.
Second, a federal system lessens the likelihood thatunwholesome laws will spread throughout the entire
nation. If state A enacts a questionable law, the remaining 49 states can observe the effects of the law
on State A before choosing to follow suit. Moreover, if the citizens of state A find the law oppressive,
they have the option ofmigrating to a neighboring state that has no such law. However, if the national
government, instead of state A, enacts the questionable law, the benefits of the states serving as
laboratories of democracy are lost. If a citizen finds the law so oppressive that the citizen feels the need
to migrate, the option of moving to a neighboring state with a similar population and tradition is gone.
The citizen must leave the country rather than just one state. Third, in a federal system the legislators
that enact the laws are closer to the people and thus can be more easily monitored. State legislators
normally maintain close ties to their communities and pursue their various occupations while in office.
Thus, they will feel the effects of the laws they pass and will be close at hand should the constituents
choose to remonstrate. On the other hand, members ofthe national legislature are separated from their
constituents and give up their occupations. They do not feel the bite ofunwholesome laws in their daily
affairs and are not close at hand to witness the agitation of their constituents.
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seemingly can, to quote Dicey, "make or unmake any law whatever."2 '3 The DPPA
is but the latest example of this fundamental change in our form of government.
Fortunately, many American jurists and statesmen are working to correct the
imbalance ofpower between the states and the national government. The New York
v. UnitedStates line of cases and the Supreme Court's appeals to "first principles"
are important steps in the corrective process. In enjoining the enforcement of the
DPPA, Judge Shedd sagaciously followed the Supreme Court's precedents and the
general trend in the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. His Tenth
Amendment analysis is solid and should be upheld on review.
As for the nondisclosure branch of privacy, the Supreme Court has been
noticeably silent concerning this area of the law. Thus, a split has developed among
the circuits, with a majority recognizing a constitutional right of nondisclosure.
Judge Shedd, bound by the Fourth Circuit's interpretations of Whalen and Nixon,
properly applied the law of the Fourth Circuit to the DPPA and concluded that the
public has no expectation of privacy in the information contained in motor vehicle
records. So long as Walls remains the law of the Fourth Circuit, Judge Shedd's
privacy analysis should be upheld on review. However, once the Supreme Court
revisits privacy in the context of nondisclosure of information, it will probably
exercisejudicial restraint by steadfastly adhering to Davis and eschewing the further
expansion of capricious judge-created rights. Any other approach will only lead to
further atrophy of the democratic elements of society.
William J. Watkins, Jr.

213. A.V. DICEY,
Fund 1982) (1885).
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DON'T COME AROUND HERE No MORE:*
THE REGULATION OF ADULT BUSINESSESZONING OR ENTITLEMENTS?
When the thoughts of a man that has a design in hand, running
over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that
design, or what designthey may conduce unto, ifhis observations
be such as are not easy or usual, this wit of his is called
PRUDENCE....

I.

NUDES, PRUDES, AND BIG BROTHER: AN INTRODUCTION

On August 12, 1997, a South Carolina newspaper announced that "[t]he city of
Columbia won its most sweeping legal victories over pornography last week with
a set of separate court rulings that could force adult businesses into other
communities."' The Mayor of Columbia referred to these wins as "'a good step
forward"' after a seven-year legal battle.2 Columbia's big gun was its zoning
ordinance, which prohibits sexually oriented businesses from locating within 1000
feet of churches, schools, residences, parks, day-care centers, and other such
businesses.3 The casualties were two adult bookstores and a topless dance club
closed to await trial, and one nude dance club and an adult bookstore closed
permanently.4 Columbia has virtually eliminated the presence of adult businesses
within the city.' Interestingly, "[t]he city ha[d] identified fewer than 30 sites where
adult shops and clubs could locate, most of them already supporting other
businesses.' 6 Furthermore, Richland County, in which Columbia lies, as well as
neighboring Lexington County, adopted similar zoning ordinances7 "out offear that
topless clubs and adult bookstores would be driven their way."' Adult businesses

* Title borrowed from ToM PETrY, Don't Come AroundHereNo More, on SOUTHERN ACCENTS
(MCA Records 1985).
** THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 40 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1994) (1668).
1. Dawn Hinshaw, Courts Uphold City in Porn Cases, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 12,
1997, at BI.
2. Id. (quoting Mayor Bob Coble).
3. COLUMBIA, S.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 6-3150 (1990).
4. Hinshaw, supranote 1.
5. Dawn Hinshaw, ZoningLaw Helps Strip Columbia ofSex Clubs, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Jan. 5, 1998, at Al.
6. Hinshaw, supra note 1.
7. See, e.g., RICHLAND COUNTY, S.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 26-212 (1997) (prohibiting
sexually oriented businesses from locating within 1,000 feetof churches, schools, residences, orparks).
8. Hinshaw, supranote 1.
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seem to have nowhere to go, at least not without a fight.
This issue lurked behind the recent South Carolina Supreme Court decision in
Condor, Inc. v. Board of ZoningAppeals,9 a case in which the Board of Zoning

Appeals, City of North Charleston, ordered two adult businesses to cease

operating.'" The adult businesses argued that the zoning ordinance they allegedly
violated was unconstitutional because it effectively zoned them out of existence and
allowed "no reasonable alternative avenues of communication" in violation of the
First Amendment." However, the court skirted the issue because the adult
businesses abandoned this argument at trial and could not raise it on appeal.
Nevertheless, the court stated in dictum, without much discussion, that the evidence
supported the trial court's conclusion that alternative locations existed within the
city.

12

At any rate, the trial court's conclusion would have fallen within the First
Amendment guidelines developed by the United States Supreme Court over the last
three decades in its struggle to balance the competing interests of adult businesses
with those of surrounding communities. The Supreme Court has held that a zoning
ordinance must "serve a substantial governmental interest and allow[] for
reasonable alternative avenues of communication."' 3 Unfortunately, this standard,
at least under the Supreme Court's guidelines, permits certain zoning abuses. The
standard empowers communities to purposefully suppress sexually oriented material
under the guise of regulation. For example, a community like Columbia could
"disperse" an established red-light district of adult businesses by effectively zoning
it out of existence. In fact, Columbia has already done just this. "For the first time
in a decade, the city of Columbia has no topless clubs or X-rated video stores."' 4
The ramifications of such a campaign raise serious constitutional and economic
5
concerns.'
9. 328 S.C. 173, 493 S.E.2d 342 (1997).
10. Id. at 175, 493 S.E.2d at 342.
11. Id. at 178, 493 S.E.2d at 344.
12. Id.
13. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
14. Hinshaw, supranote 5.
15. See infra Part III. Additionally, the regulation of adult businesses through zoning ordinances
is inefficient. Consider, again, the situation in Columbia, South Carolina. In a series entitled Adult
Businesses in the Midlands, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Sept. 7-9, 1997, a Columbia newspaper
reported on the "sex industry" in the Columbia area. One article stated that adult businesses "have to
advertise or cause trouble to get noticed by the officials who are supposed to regulate them .... Beyond
that, [they] are mostly left alone, despite the appearances of tough laws that are supposed to regulate
where they locate." Dawn Hinshaw & Douglas Pardue, Now We See Them, Now We Don't,THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), Sept. 7, 1997, at Al. The article partly blamed the subjective method of regulation,
stating that "adult businesses are policed not by vice squads, but by zoning officers .... And
enforcement in the metro area is not only subjective, it's haphazard." Id. at A10. In fact, Columbia's
largest dealer of adult merchandise, the "Emperor of the Lonely Empire," has made a game out of
complying with Columbia's zoning ordinance by stocking non-sexual merchandise to reduce the
percentage of sexual merchandise in his stores' inventories; he stocks whatever "regular" movies the
wholesaler sends, so that you can now find copies of John Wayne movies and children's cartoons
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The currentjudicial framework for analyzing the regulation of adult businesses
through zoning ordinances inadequately addresses these concerns; therefore, a
different framework is necessary. The purpose of this Comment is to provide this
framework by using Calabresi & Melamed's nuisance model and their system of
"entitlements"' 6 to apply economic analysis to the regulation of adult businesses.
Such an analysis is more than academic. Judge Posner explains:
Economic analysis, and more broadly the scientific attitude that
underlies positive economics and emphasizes respect for fact and for clear
thinking, has the further value of exposing the shallowness of much
moralizing in Western culture generally, and in American culture
particularly, about sexuality. Such a critique can clear the ground for a
normative analysis in which sexual regulations are evaluated by their
practical consequences rather than by their conformity to moral, political,
or religious ideas. Clear thinking about sexuality is obstructed by layers of
ignorance, ideology, superstition, and prejudice that the acid bath of
economics can help us peel away.17
In other words, economic analysis allows one to avoid the murky area of morality
that ostensibly informs the regulation of adult businesses. Hence, one can determine
how to regulate adult businesses based on practical market dictates.' 8
As background, this Comment will first discuss the development of the United
States Supreme Court's current framework for analyzing the regulation of adult
businesses through zoning ordinances. Part III will examine the inherent problems
with this framework, particularly its failure to address certain constitutional and
economic concerns. Part IV will then examine the regulation of adult businesses
under Calabresi & Melamed's system of entitlements, finally concluding that the
regulation of adult businesses according to their nuisance model addresses the
concerns the current framework ignores.

alongside hard-core pornographic movies. Id. This tactic could keep his store from falling within the
zoning ordinance. Id. Hence, Columbia's campaign is both efficient to the point of being
unconstitutional regarding the businesses it has closed and completely inefficient regarding other
businesses.
16. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, LiabilityRules, andInalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
17. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 437 (1992).
18. The idea is not to dismiss moral theories completely, but rather to realize moral theories are
falsifiable, that is, we can recast them as scientific, testable hypotheses. Id. at 220-224. In effect, "[w]e
can ransack them for their factual implications and then assess the accuracy of those implications, and
by that means determine whether these theories provide an adequate positive and normative analysis
of our subject." Id. at 223.
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II. SEX, LIES, AND COURT REPORTERS: THE SUPREME COURT AND ADULT
BUSINESSES

As of 1975, adult businesses fell within the aegis of the First Amendment,
which restricted a community's power to regulate them, or so Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville9 suggested. In Erznoznikthe United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from
showing films containing nudity when the screen was visible from public streets or
places." The state trial and appellate courts upheld the ordinance as a legitimate
exercise of municipal power that did not infringe on the appellant's First
Amendment rights.2 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, viewed the case as a
conflict between the speaker's First Amendment rights and the unwilling viewers'
privacy rights.' As a general principle, the Court stated:
A State or municipality may protect individual privacy by enacting
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations applicable to all speech
irrespective of content. But when the government, acting as censor,
undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on
the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amendment
strictly limits its power.'
A majority of the Court held the ordinance unconstitutional as overbroad and
suggested that a community could only use its zoning power within the bounds of
the First Amendment. 4
In 1976, one year after Erznoznik,the Court decided the pivotal case of Young
v. American Mini Theatres,Inc.' In AmericanMini Theatresthe Court considered
the constitutionality of Detroit's anti-skid row zoning ordinances, which were
designed to disperse red-light districts by prohibiting adult theaters from locating
within 1000 feet of any two regulated uses, 2 6 or within 500 feet of a residential
area. The Court refused to consider the respondents' vagueness claim. 28 Justice

19. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
20. Id. at 206.
21. Id. at 207.
22. Id. at 208.
23. Id. at 209 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 211-12 ("Its effect is to deter drive-in theaters from showing movies containing nudity,
however innocent or even educational .... Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of
persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis
of its content.").
25. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
26. Regulated uses included, among others, adult bookstores, cabarets, bars, motels, pawnshops,
and pool halls. See id. at 52 n.3.
27. Id. at 52.
28. Id. at 59-61.
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Stevens, writing for the majority, stated:
Since there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of
material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic
expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political
significance, and since the limited amount ofuncertainty in the ordinances
is easily susceptible of a narrowing construction, we think this is an
inappropriate case in which to adjudicate the hypothetical claims of
persons not before the Court. 9
He later elaborated that a less vital interest exists in protecting sexually explicit
material:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate the
total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value,
it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expression is
of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in
untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal
comment.... Even though the First Amendment protects communication
in this area from total suppression, we hold that the State may legitimately
use the content of these materials as the basis for placing them in a
different classification from other motion pictures.3"
However, Justice Powell viewed the case as a unique situation warranting "a
careful inquiry into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected
by the guarantee of free expression." 3' Although he concurred because he believed
the government's infringement offree speech was incidental and minimal," Powell
did not agree with Stevens's content-based distinction between forms of protected
speech. Justice Powell reiterated the limitation implied in Stevens's opinion that 33
a
governmental entity could not completely suppress sexually explicit expression,
and further cautioned that "courts must be alert to the possibility of direct rather
than incidental effect of zoning on expression, and especially to the possibility of
'
using the power to zone as a pretext for suppressing expression."34
Several commentators responded to theAmericanMini Theatresdecision. One

29. Id. at 61.
30.Id. at 70-71.
31. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).

32. Id. at 78.
33. Id. Justice Powell outlined a two-step inquiry: "(i) Does the ordinance impose any content
limitation on the creators of adult movies or their ability to make them available to whom they desire,
and (ii) does it restrict in any significant way the viewing of these movies by those who desire to see
ihem?" Id.
34. Id. at 84.
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believed it heralded the return of variable obscenity35 and feared it would allow
states to freely regulate constitutionally protected speech based on its sexual
content. 36 Another commentator believed a new legal phenomenon emerged from
American Mini Theatres, a phenomenon she termed "'adult' law. ' 37 She found the
American Mini Theatres decision particularly disturbing, because she believed it
would promulgate censorship and burden local and state judiciaries.3 8
The Court alleviated these fears somewhat when it decided Schadv. Borough
ofMount Ephraim39 five years later. In Schadoperators of an adult bookstore that
offered live, coin-operated, peep shows challenged the imposition of criminal
penalties against them under a zoning ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment
(not just adult entertainment). 0 The Court entertained.the appellants' overbreadth

claim,4' finding that the Borough's zoning ordinance infringed upon "a protected

' requiring
liberty,"42
scrutiny of both the Borough's motive and means. 4 3 In his
concurrence, Justice Blackmun stated:

I would emphasize that the presumption of validity that traditionally
attends a local government's exercise of its zoning powers carries little, if
any, weight where the zoning regulation trenches on rights of expression
protected under the First Amendment.
... It would be a substantial step beyond [American] Mini Theatresto
conclude that a town or county may legislatively prevent its citizens from
engaging in or having access to forms of protected expression that are
35. "Variable obscenity" is the doctrine "under which the obscenity of the materials in question
would be evaluated by looking to the context of their distribution and the state's interest in this
particular form ofregulation." Frederick F. Schauer, The Return of VariableObscenity?,28 HASTINGS
L.J. 1275, 1276 (1977).
36. Id. at 1289 ("[T]he necessary implication of [American Mini Theatres] is that now the states
are permitted to regulate material which has the requisite degree of serious political, artistic, literary,
or scientific value, or which does not appeal to the prurient interest, or which is not patently
offensive.").
37. Jane M. Friedman, Zoning "Adult" Movies: The PotentialImpact ofYoung v. American
Mini Theaters, 28 HAsTINGs L.J. 1293, 1293 (1977).
38. Id. at 1295. Friedman explained that
the American Mini Theat[res] decision is bound to create a censorial nightmare
for the entire motion picture industry and, consequently, for the movie-going
public. Moreover, that decision will, in all likelihood, impose substantial burdens
on the state and local judiciaries which will be compelled to become involved in
a new, and additional, genre of litigation over erotic movies. Now the courts will
be called upon to decide not only which movies are 'obscene' under state and
local obscenity laws, but also, on a case-by-case basis, which movies are 'adult'
within the meaning of a burgeoning number of local zoning ordinances.
Id.
39. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
40. Id. at 64.
41. Id. at 66.
42. Id. at 68.
43. Id. at 71.
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incompatible with its majority's conception of the "decent life" solely
because these activities are sufficiently available in other locales."
However, perhaps because Schad involved the regulation of more than just adult
entertainment, its apparent limitation on a community's zoning power would not
last.
In 1986 the Court decided City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc." Below,
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had struck down as an invalid restriction
on speech a zoning ordinance modeled on the Detroit ordinance at issue in
American Mini Theatres.45 Although the district court had found that Renton's
ordinance left 520 acres available for adult theaters, the court of appeals found most
of this land actually unavailable,47 and concluded that Renton's ordinance
substantially restricted protected speech.48 The court stated that the Renton
ordinance was "quite different in its effect" from the Detroit zoning ordinance
upheld in American Mini Theatres.49
The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, found
that the decision in American Mini Theatres dictated the resolution of Renton;
Renton's ordinance, like Detroit's, did not ban adult theaters completely.5" Justice
Rehnquist stated that "[t]he appropriate inquiry.., is whether the Renton ordinance
is designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable
alternative avenues of communication."" As for "reasonable alternative avenues,"
however, he completely disregarded the findings of the court of appeals:
That respondents must fend for themselves in the real estate market, on an
equal footing with other prospectivepurchasers and lessees, does not give
rise to a First Amendment violation. And although we have cautioned

against the enactment of zoning regulations that have "the effect of
suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech," we have never
suggested that the First Amendment compels the Government to ensure
that adult theaters, or any other kinds of speech-related businesses for that
matter, will be able to obtain sites at bargain prices.5"

44. Id. at 77-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

45. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
46. Id. at 43.
47. Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A substantial
part of the 520 acres is occupied by: (1) a sewage disposal site and treatment plant; (2) a horseracing
track and environs; (3) a business park containing buildings suitable only for industrial use; (4) a
warehouse and manufacturing facilities; (5) a Mobil Oil tank farm; and, (6) a fully-developed shopping
center."), rev'd, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Renton, 475 U.S. at 46.

51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 54 (citation omitted) (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,71
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The dissent found Justice Rehnquist's reasoning disingenuous. Under Renton's
ordinance, adult theaters are hamstrung before being tossed into the real estate
market. As the dissent noted, the "respondents are not on equal footing with other
prospective purchasers and lessees, but must conduct business under severe
restrictions not imposed upon other establishments. 53
III. THE NAKED TRUTH: THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK AND ITS PROBLEMS
After Renton, the test for determining the validity of a zoning ordinance that
regulates adult businesses is whether the ordinance "is designed to serve a

substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of

communication." 4 This test pits traditional governmental concerns against the First
Amendment. Of course, this conflict is not novel. According to one commentator,
"The antagonism stems from a community's right to provide for its social welfare
and the adult entertainment provider's rightto freedom of speech and expression.
Stated differently, "Adult zoning represents a clash between two of society's most
heartfelt desires: the desire to exercise freedom ofexpression, and the desire to live
in a community free from distasteful activity."56 This clash of interests is
problematic. Although zoning is a powerful tool for dealing with many problems
of modern urban living," communities can abuse this power and infringe upon First
Amendment rights."
The most significant form of zoning abuse, as Justice Powell forewarned in
American Mini Theatres, 9 occurs when a community regulates adult businesses in
an effort to purposefully suppress sexually oriented material which is, at least
ostensibly, constitutionally protected.' Indeed, zoning ordinances often treat adult
businesses so harshly that they are driven out of town, 6 a result facilitated by the
Court's analysis in Renton. For example, the City of Columbia has succeeded, at
least temporarily, in driving adult businesses outside the city limits.' Because the
usual pretext for regulating adult establishments is combating the harmful secondary

n.35 (1976)).
53. Id. at 65 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 50.
55. Alfred C. Yen, JudicialReview of the Zoning of Adult Entertainment: A Search for the
Purposeful Suppression ofProtected Speech, 12 PEPP. L. REv. 651, 651 (1985) (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. at 668.

57. Yen, supra note 55, at 651. "The Supreme Court firmly established the broad power ofzoning
in [Village ofEuclidv. AmblerRealy Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)]. Municipalities were given the power
to further the public health, safety, morals, and welfare by restricting the permissible uses of land." Id.
58. Id. at 652-53.
59. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 84 (Powell, J., concurring).
60. Yen, supra note 55, at 653 ("Local communities are often hostile to the sexually explicit

nature of adult entertainment. These towns may zone adult establishments not in an effort to regulate
community problems, but in an effort to restrict or suppress adult speech itself.").
61. Id. at 656.
62. See Hinshaw, supranote 5.
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effects of these businesses, 63 some members of the Court have thought that lower
courts should determine whether the community is legitimately addressing these
secondary effects or purposefully suppressing protected speech.' A major factor in
this determination is ascertaining the existence and extent of the harmful secondary
effects. "Adult establishments are often associated with crime [and] neighborhood
decay." ' Moreover, according to one commentator, "There is substantial, but not
overwhelming, evidence that exposure to obscenity causes antisocial or criminal
behavior."" However, the existence and extent of any harmful secondary effects is
far from conclusive, particularly considering the conflicting studies available on the
subject.
The two most comprehensive studies on the subject are those conducted under
the authority ofthe United States government in 1970 by the Johnson Commission67
and in 1986 by the Meese Commission.6 8 The two reports reached contrary
conclusions. The Johnson Commission, in determining the effects of pornographic
communications on their audience, concluded:
[E]mpirical research designed to clarify the question has found no evidence
to date that exposure to explicit sexual materials plays a significant role in
63. One commentator has noted that
[tlhere are at least three different concerns motivating those who would limit the
dissemination of sexually explicit material: the antisocial behavior engendered
by exposure to the material, the exploitation of those who participate in
production of the material, and the quality of community life in and around
commercial outlets which disseminate such material.
Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity, Pornography,andFirstAmendment Theory, 2 WM. &MARY BILLRTS.
J. 471,471 (1993). As Loewy points out, the "rationale for channeling only sexually explicit speech [as

opposed to other forms of speech] is that it has a greater capacity to invade privacy or destroy
neighborhoods than most other types of speech; therefore, it may be subject to greater regulation." Id.
at 486-87. For example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the court
quoted from a Detroit ordinance which acknowledged that some uses "are recognized as having serious
objectionable operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are concentrated under
certain circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect upon the adjacent areas." Id. at 54 n.6.
64. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 57 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[B]efore deferring to [Renton's] judgment, [we] must be convinced that the city is
seriously and comprehensively addressing' secondary land-use effects associated with adult movie
theaters. In this case, both the language of the ordinance and its dubious legislative history belie the
Court's conclusion that 'the city's pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression
of free expression' (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Deigo, 453 U.S. 490,531 (1981) (Brennan, J. concurring in judgment) & (quoting City ofRenton, 475
U.S. at 48)); see also id. at 57-62 (discussing dubious legislative "findings"). In Renton the dissent
concluded, "In sum, the circumstances here strongly suggest that the ordinance was designed to
suppress expression, even that constitutionally protected ..... Id. at 62.
65. Yen, supra note 55, at 661.
66. Loewy, supranote 63, at 472.
67. U.S. COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970) [hereinafter JOHNSON COMM'N REP.].
68. ATrORNEY GEN.'s COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT (1986) [hereinafter MEESE
COMM'N REP.].
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the causation of delinquent or criminal behavior among youth or adults.
The Commission cannot conclude that exposure to erotic materials is a
factor in the causation of sex crime or sex delinquency. 69
The Meese Commission, however, found to the contrary. The report concluded
"that the available evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that substantial
exposure to sexually violent materials... bears a causal relationship to antisocial
acts of sexual violence and, for some subgroups, possibly to unlawful acts of sexual
violence. 70 The different compositions ofthe two commissions probably accounts
for the discrepancy between their respective conclusions.7 At any rate, widespread
criticism greeted the publication of both reports,72 and neither report's conclusion
is unimpeachable.
Moreover, local governments need not even conduct their own research to
determine whether any secondary effects exist within their own communities.
Instead, the Supreme Court allows them to rely on the "findings" of other
communities. 3 In Renton the Court stated that
[t]he First Amendment does not require a city, before enacting such an
ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city
relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses.74
Hence, not only are the findings legislatures usually rely on subject to question, 75
but also communities do not even need to determine whether any "effects" are
actually present in their particular locales. As the dissent in Renton pointed out, this
approach immunizes a community's purpose in enacting a zoning ordinance from
judicial scrutiny,76 allowing communities to take advantage of the Court's holding
and "use their zoning powers as a pretext for suppressing constitutionally protected

69. JOHNSON COMM'N REP., supranote 67, at 27 (footnote omitted).
70. MEESE COMM'N REP., supra note 68, at 326.
71. According to two commentators, "[Tihe orientation of the members of [the Meese C]ommission was profoundly antismut; indeed, the origin of the commission was to serve as a counterpoint
to the Johnson Commission, which many conservatives regarded as cheerleading for the increased
availability of pornography." GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE

SOcIETY xi (1988).
72. Id. at ix-x.

73. See City ofRenton v. PlaytimeTheatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,51 (1986) (allowing Renton to rely
on the experiences of other cities to support its enactment of an adult theater zoning ordinance).
74. Id. at 51-52.
75. See supra text accompanying note 72.
76. Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A] municipality can readily find other municipal
ordinances to rely upon, thus always retrospectively justifying special zoning regulations for adult
theaters.").
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expression.""
Another problem arises when courts try to balance governmental interests
against First Amendment concerns, because it is difficult to calculate the extent of
the First Amendment concerns. Although this task is daunting in any case, courts
simply cannot reasonably accomplish it in cases involving the regulation of adult
businesses."8 A court must, or at least should, consider many interests. Hawkins and
Zimring have outlined four First Amendment interests that arise in the context of
adult businesses:
There are four distinct free-expression interests implicated in decisions
about the regulation of pornographic communication. First, there is the
claim of individuals to publish material they believe to be of interest or
value, which, although not intended to be pornographic, might be regarded
by others as pornographic. Second, there is the right of an audience to see
or hear such material even if in the eyes of some persons it might be
regarded as obscene.... Third, there is the interest in sending explicitly
pornographic communications or messages. Here it is claimed that the
interest in free expression includes the free expression of ideas or images
intended to arouse sexually. Fourth, it is claimed that the interest in
freedom of choice includes the right to choose to be exposed to
intentionally pornographic communication.79
The interaction of these interests is perplexing. Courts experience extreme
difficulty balancing First Amendment concerns with the substantial governmental
interests recognized in Renton, rendering the balancing approach far from ideal.8"
In sum, the Court's current guidelines for regulating adult businesses through
zoning are dangerous, particularly considering the Court's inconsistency in this

77. Id.
78. In United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), Judge Learned Hand, quoting the
Supreme Court, stated:
"When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation
results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the
particular circumstances presented." "We must therefore, undertake the 'delicate and
difficult task... to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality ofthe reasons
advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights."'
Id. at 211 (citations omitted) (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399,
400 (1950) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 141, 161 (1939))). Judge Hand offered the following
formula: "In each case [the court] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." Id. at 212. In
the case ofregulating adult businesses, courts can reasonably calculate neither the gravity ofthe "evil,"
see supranotes 65-76 and accompanying text, nor the extent of the invasion of free speech necessary.
See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
79. HAWKINS &ZIMRING, supra note 71, at 144-45.
80. See Yen, supra note 55, at 656-57.
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area. " Consider the status ofthis issue in Columbia, South Carolina.82 Whether or
not it intends to do so, Columbia is suppressing constitutionally protected speech
with no clear indication the adult businesses the city is zoning out of existence are
actually causing any harm. A new framework for handling the conflict between

adult businesses and their surrounding communities is therefore warranted. The
following section examines this conflict under Calabresi & Melamed's economic
framework of "entitlements."
Before turning to this analysis, however, one more point merits consideration.
The sex industry is big. "It's a booming business, with high-class strip clubs,
topless bars and major chains spreading across the nation. By some reports there
are more than 2,500 large clubs, many easily capable of taking in more than $1
million a year."83 In Columbia, Chippendolls, which has closed," earned as much
as $300,000 a year.8 Furthermore, Columbia's 174 licensed dancers earn more
than $4.5 million a year. 6 As for other adult businesses, "[s]exual depiction, in the
forms modem society terms 'pornography' or 'obscenity,' is a multi-billion dollar
industry."87 One purveyor in Columbia, for example, brings in nearly $1.9 million
a year.88

81. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 63, at 493 ("From its refusal to take government arguments
seriously in Erznoznikto its refusal to take free speech interests seriously in Renton, the Court has come
full circle.").
82. See supranotes 1-8, 14 and accompanying text.
83. Douglas Pardue & Dawn Hinshaw, Business is Taking Off, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Sept. 8, 1997, atAl.
84. See Hinshaw, supra note 1.
85. Pardue & Hinshaw, supranote 83, at Al.
86. Id. This estimate is conservative. Id.
87. Nicholas Wolfson, Eroticism, Obscenity,PornographyandFreeSpeech, 60 BRoOK. L. REV.
1037, 1037 (1994).
88. Douglas Pardue & Dawn Hinshaw, Lonely EmpireFlashes X', THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.),
Sept. 9, 1997, at Al.
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IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ADULT BUSINESSES
AND COMMUNITMS
A. Entitlements, Protection,andExternalities89
A state must decide which side to favor when presented with the conflicting
interests of two or more persons or groups of persons.' This decision is called
setting the entitlement-a first order decision.91 The second order decision is
whether to protect this entitlement with a property rule or a liability rule.92 "An
entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes
to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller."'93 A
court creates this dynamic through equitable relief, usually by issuing an injunction
preventing the one side from interfering with the other side's entitlement.94 If the
one side wishes to override this entitlement, it must "buy out" the protected side
at the protected side's price. On the other hand, "[w]henever someone may destroy
the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it,
an entitlement is protected by a liability rule."95 A court accomplishes this with the
legal remedy of compensatory damages.96 The one side is allowed to purchase the
entitlement at a predetermined price without the protected side's consent; "an
external, objective standard of value is used to facilitate the transfer of the
entitlement."97 Because the first order decision depends on the second, one must
first determine which form of protection is appropriate before actually deciding
whether the adult businesses or the community should receive the entitlement.
Employing Calabresi & Melamed's framework, courts should use a liabilityprotected entitlement in the present situation because transaction costs are high. In

89. This Comment assumes some reader familiarity with economic analysis. For additional
background, see ROBERT COOER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMIcs (1988); RIcHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (5th ed. 1998); and Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16.
This section analyzes the conflict between adult businesses and their surrounding communities
under the "entitlements" framework articulated by Calabresi and Melamed, particularly their nuisance,
or pollution, model. This model is applied to the situation in which a community, such as Columbia,
wishes to regulate several established adult businesses clustered together in a red-light district.
Furthermore, forthe sake of argument, the premise that adult businesses, particularly red-light districts,
impart harmful secondary effects such as crime and antisocial behavior is accepted. See MEESE
COMM'N REP., supranote 68; see also supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
90. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1090.

91. Id.
92. Id.at 1092. For our purposes, we will not consider"inalienable entitlements." See id. at 1092,

1123-24.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 1092.
COOMER & ULEN, supra note 89, at 102.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1092.
CooTmR & ULEN, supra note 89, at 102.
Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 16, at 1106.
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other words, the obstacles to cooperation are significant and courts should
therefore award compensatory damages." Obstacles to cooperation are present in
the Columbia conflict because the external costs" of the adult businesses are a
"public bad," a harm that affects many people."cn In such cases, private bargaining
usually fails because ofstrategic behavior and high communication and monitoring
costs.'"' In other words, the parties cannot settle the dispute themselves because
transaction costs are so high that a transfer of the entitlement will not take place
even though such a transfer would benefit all parties concerned." ° "[P]ublic bads
are not self-correcting." °3 In such situations, we can only restore economic
efficiency by requiring the externality-generator to internalize the external costs."
The externality generator must pay for them by compensating victims with money
05
damages.
If, on the other hand, transaction costs were low, a property-protected
entitlement would be appropriate. Ifthis were the case, it would not matter whether
courts gave the entitlement to the adult businesses or the community, because,
according to the Positive Coase Theorem," ° "when partiescan bargaintogether
and settle their disagreements by cooperation, their behavior will be efficient
regardless of the underlying rule of law."'0 7 But because a liability-protected

entitlement is appropriate in this case, courts must, under Calabresi & Melamed's
framework, carefully consider wchether to give the entitlement to the adult
businesses or to the community.
B. The Economics of a PublicNuisance
"In terms of microeconomic theory, non-separability of individual property
rights occurs when there are externalities and when one of the resources is a public
bad."'0 8 In the case of adult businesses, there are externalities and a public bad.
Hence, the rights of the adult businesses to use their properties for purveying
constitutionally protected speech are not separable from the rights of the

98. COOER & ULEN, supranote 89, at 107.
99. External costs, or externalities, "are involuntary costs imposed upon one person by another.
Since market transactions are voluntary, externalities are outside the market system of change-hence
their name." Id. at 116.
100. Id. at 107.
101. Id. For an illustration of strategic behavior, including the problems of "hold-outs" and
"freeloaders," see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 16, at 1106-07.
102. Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 16, at 1106.
103. COoTER & ULEN, supra note 89, at 117; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 16, at
1119 ("Mransaction costs are often high on both sides and an initial entitlement, though incorrect in
terms of economic efficiency, will not be altered in the market place.").
104. COOTER & ULEN, supranote 89, at 170.
105. Id. at 107.
106. See RH. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
107. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 89, at 105.
108. Id. at 169.
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surrounding community members to live in an environment free from such
"distasteful activity"'1' or the government's interest in protecting this right.
Moreover, efficiency requires the internalization of external costs."' "[O]ne of the
important economic aspects of property law is to try to induce this cost
internalization when property rights are not separable.'
Furthermore, "[i]n
'
property law, a harmful externality is called a nuisance,"" 2 and "a harmful
externality of the public type [i]s a 'public nuisance.""' 3 Calabresi & Melamed's
model provides the proper framework for determining who gets the entitlement.
Under Calabresi & Melamed's model, there are four possibilities, which they
call rules. 1 4 Because we have determined that a liability-protected entitlement is
appropriate, we need only consider rules two and four." 5 Essentially, rule two is
a liability-protected entitlement given to the victim." 6 The externality generator is
allowed to continue its operation, but must pay money compensation to the victim;
it must internalize the costs. Rule four, which is rarely used," 7 is a liabilityprotected entitlement given to the externality generator." 8 The victim can stop the
externality generator's operations, but must compensate the externality generator.
This rule is "really a kind of partial eminent domain coupled with a benefits
tax.""..9 In the context of adult businesses, rule two would allow them to continue
to operate, but they would have to compensate the community. Rule four would
allow the community to "buy out" the adult businesses.

In deciding between rules two and four, Calabresi & Melamed advise

consideration of whose damages are easier to calculate and recover. 2 ' "A
judgment on these questions is necessary to an evaluation of the possible economic
efficiency benefits of employing one rule rather than another.'' When the costs
of these calculations are not symmetrical, we should give the entitlement to the
party whose damages are easier to calculate and recover.
In the case of Columbia, South Carolina, the community's damages seem

109. See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
110. See supranotes 104-05 and accompanying text.
111. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 89, at 170.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 171.
114. Calabresi & Melamed,supranote 16, at 1115-16.
115. Rules one and three are property-protected entitlements. Id. at 1116.
116. Id.
117. Legal writers often ignore this rule because "it does not often lend itself to judicial
imposition for a number of good legal process reasons.... [Tjhe courts would be faced with the
immensely difficult task of determining who was benefited how much and imposing a benefits tax
accordingly, all the while observing procedural limits within which courts are expected to function."
Id. at 1116-17.
118. Id.at 1116.
119. Id.
120. Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 16, at 1120-21.
121. Id. at 1122.
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easier to calculate.' " The community's damages are what it costs the government
to neutralize the harmful, secondary effects of the adult businesses. Because
increased crime and urban decay are the most common purported effects of adult
businesses,'" the government's costs would consist of increased police presence,
urban renewal, and concomitant administrative expenditures. Although these costs
are not easy to calculate, the government could establish them with some certainty.
On the other hand, if the community could shut down the adult businesses, the
adult businesses' damages would consist of the businesses' lost profits. Although
this figure might be easy to calculate, it would not adequately represent the
damages to the interests of others, such as the First Amendment rights of the
publishers and consumers of sexually explicit materials. 24 Indeed, one
commentator believes that the measure of First Amendment protection afforded
adult establishments should be "that which is necessary to ensure that book
publishers and movie producers have ample opportunity to reach their
audiences"'' 2 s an extremely difficult calculation. 6 Ultimately, because the
community's damages are easier to calculate, we should give the entitlement to the
community.
One more question remains. Should courts award temporary or permanent
damages to the community?" 7 Cooter and Ulen explain:
The greatest benefit of temporary damages is that the limited time period
over which the damages are computed means that they are probably more
accurately measured and that the court may respond more flexibly to
changes that may make the external cost more or less serious .... The
greatest cost of temporary damages is that they require repeated litigation
of the dispute, although it may be the case that the costs of periodically
resolving the dispute fall.

122. This Comment does not consider the case in which an adult business moves into an
established community outside ofa red-light district orwhere a community grows around an established
adult business. The first case is actually irrelevant, because if adult businesses are forced to internalize
their costs by paying damages to their neighbors, they will locate where these costs are lowest-near
other adult businesses. In fact, adult businesses likely confer external benefits on each other when
located in close proximity (consider Bourbon Street, New Orleans), a fact that could explain the
proliferation of red-light districts. Anti skid-row ordinances work against these market forces. Hence,
market forces would ultimately lead to the situation in which a community is combating red-light
districts anyway. The second case, where a community grows around an established adult business,
requires a different analysis, and could possibly require an application ofCalabresi &Melamed's fourth
rule. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Web Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972) (involving a real
estate developerwho located residences near an established nuisance). Such a case, however, is beyond
the scope of this Comment.
123. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
124. See supranote 80 and accompanying text.
125. Loewy, supranote 63, at 487.
126. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
127. COOER & ULEN, supra note 89, at 177.
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...The greatest benefit of permanent damages is that it resolves the
dispute between the parties once and for all, with the proviso that the
defendant has paid for all past and future harms only at the level specified
in the judgment.... The costs of permanent damages are two-fold. First,
the estimation of present discounted harms is an exercise fraught with a
large amount ofuncertainty and, therefore, is subject to error. Second, this
form of damages does not allow either the parties or the court much
flexibility to take account of future changes in the [circumstances].' 2 8
The choice between temporary or permanent damages depends "on the
particular circumstances of the dispute."129 In the context of Columbia, South
Carolina, temporary damages seem more appropriate, not only for the reasons
stated above, but also because of one particular circumstance-the owners ofadult
businesses will likely change overtime. Permanent damages would not account for
future, unrepresented businesses. Either the current businesses would bear these
damages, or the damages would go uncompensated, particularly if the adult
entertainment experienced unanticipated growth. With temporary damages, new
determinations at specified intervals would properly account for such
contingencies. The benefit of accurate damages determinations would likely
outweigh the costs of repeated litigation, particularly when compared with the
costs of error and uncertainty in such a case.
In sum, because transaction costs are high in the case of regulating adult
businesses, courts should use a liability-protected entitlement. Moreover, because
the community's damages are easier to calculate, applying Calabresi & Melamed's
framework, this entitlement should be granted to the community. Courts should not
enjoin adult businesses from operating. Instead, the adult businesses should
compensate the community with money damages measured by the cost to the
government of protecting the community's rights. Finally, these damages should
be temporary, paid at regular intervals.
V. SKID-Row PoLITICS: A CONCLUSION
Allowing adult businesses to continue operating in red-light districts by paying
damages to a community for their secondary effects is more efficient than allowing
the community to regulate adult businesses through zoning ordinances. A
community hostile to adult businesses is apt to abuse its zoning power in an
attempt to purposefully suppress constitutionally protected speech. When taken to
the extreme, as in Renton and perhaps in Columbia, South Carolina as well, such
abuse leaves adult businesses nowhere to go. The social costs are considerable:
adult businesses are a multi-billion dollar industry that affords the exchange of

128. Id.
129. Id.
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constitutionally protected materials pursuant to the First Amendment rights of
publishers, distributors, and consumers. Allowing the businesses to continue
operation protects these interests, and the payment of damages protects the rights
of the community and forces the adult businesses to internalize costs. In addition,
the necessary litigation by the government to recover damages would require
further investigation into the extent adult businesses actually cause harmful,
secondary effects. Ironically, however, this fact would probably go a long way in
keeping politicians from supporting such an analysis. As stated in the introduction,
the current framework gives communities unlimited and unchecked power to
regulate adult businesses at little cost to the government-a powerful tool
affording politicians inexpensive political currency. Notwithstanding its limited
potential for adoption, a rule based on Calabresi & Melamed's nuisance model is
fair and efficient, and it avoids the difficult constitutional questions implicated
under the zoning method of regulating adult businesses.
James C. Bradley
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DIRTY DANCING: THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME
COURT REJECTS LOCAL AUTHORITY TO BAN NUDE
DANCING BY FAST-STEPPING AROUND THE PLAIN
MEANING OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA
CONSTITUTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Columbia, South Carolina, nude dancing' establishments seem to be
perfectly legal-so long as no one complains about them. Currently, the city's
zoning ordinance for adult businesses specifies that such establishments must not

be located within five hundred feet of a residence, church, school, or other adult
business.2 The result: only about thirty business locations in the entire city are
acceptable locations for adult businesses? The current local zoning policies
inadequately address an issue of public morality that should be resolved for the
whole community.' The situation worsened last year when the South Carolina
Supreme Court decided Diamonds v. Greenville County.' In Diamonds the court
ruled that the South Carolina Constitution prohibited any local government from
passing a general public nudity restriction as long as nude dancing alone is not
forbidden by state law." The court's decision further entrenches the approach
Columbia uses in dealing with nude dancing, an approach that amounts to little
more than chasing nude dancing establishments from place to place until they end
up in areas where neighborhood outrage overtheir presence is outweighed by public
apathy.
Part II of this Note examines federal constitutional treatment of nude dancing,
focusing primarily on the doctrines of obscenity and expressive conduct. Part III
surveys and discusses South Carolina law and analyzes the Diamonds case. The
Note addresses two defects in the Diamonds decision: (1)Diamonds is inconsistent
with First Amendment case law and the South Carolina Constitution, and (2) the
decision hinders the development of a system for local control over nude dancing
that is both ideologically coherent and effective in practice.7 This Note suggests that

1. This Note addresses all-nude, live dancing. Thus, references to "nude dancing" do not
encompass non-live or semi-nude adult performances.
2. Dawn Hinshaw, Courts Uphold City in Porn Cases: Adult Businesses Must Move or Close
Doors, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 12, 1997, at B1.
3. Id.
4. See infra note 8.
5. 325 S.C. 154, 480 S.E.2d 718 (1997).
6. Id. at 157-58, 480 S.E.2d at 719-20.
7. Zoning is often seen as a way to mitigate the more direct harms caused by nude dancing
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the supreme court reconsider Diamondsand its interpretation of the South Carolina
Constitution so as to adhere more faithfully to the language recognizing the
sovereignty of local communities in regard to public morals. Part IV demonstrates
that enhanced local control is necessary to develop solutions that are practically and
philosophically sound. Finally, this Note urges the court to overrule Diamonds and
allow communities to choose between prohibiting public nudity generally and
accepting or tolerating nude dancing as a legitimate business.
II. NUDE DANCING AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

Courts have considered two constitutional questions in relation to nude
dancing: (1) whether such conduct is obscene and thus beyond the scope of the
speech protected by the First Amendment; 8 and (2) whether, even if not obscene,
the conduct is sufficiently expressive to fall within the definition of First
Amendment speech. 9 Although the United States Supreme Court has not
significantly altered its obscenity doctrine over the past twenty-five years,' 0 the
application of the doctrine to discrete situations continues to be unpredictable."
This phenomenon reflects the seemingly contradictory mandates of obscenity and
First Amendment theories and the extremely subjective judgment required to
balance them. The concept of obscenity rests on the proposition that some things are
so offensive to everyone that they must be suppressed.' 2 In contrast, the First
Amendment embraces the principle that the marketplace of ideas will reject that

which has no value; therefore, suppression by the government is not only dangerous
but also unnecessary. 3 In eschewing absolute deference to either principle, the

establishments. However, this is a troubling approach. Zoning proposals restricting nude dancing can
have three possible effects: (1) the nude dancing establishments continue to operate and their customers
absorb the costs ofmoving the clubs to other business locations; (2) business declines and fewer people
"consume" nude performances; or (3) the establishments go out of business entirely. In the first
scenario, most of the problems created by nude dancing would not be solved; nude performances would
just become more expensive to watch. In the second scenario, problems may increase as lower paid
dancers strive to earn more money by making their dancing more sexually explicit. Finally, if zoning
does eliminate nude dancing, then economic strangulation has replaced the democratic process in
producing such a result. Thus, zoning is an incomplete solution at best and, at worst, concentrates the
harmful effects of nude dancing within certain segments ofsociety. For a more thorough discussion of
the various deficiencies of zoning laws in practice, see Dawn Hinshaw & Douglas Pardue, Adult
Businesses in the Midlands,THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Sept. 7, 8, & 9, 1997, at Al.
8. See Connor v. Hilton Head, 314 S.C. 251, 253-56, 442 S.E.2d 608, 609-10 (1994).
9. See infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
10. Marion D. Hefner, Note, "RoastPigs"andMiller-Light:VariableObscenity in the Nineties,
1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 843, 850 (1996) ("The test announced in Miller is the test still employed for
determining the constitutionality of obscenity regulation.").
11. Id. at 850-63.
12. 50 AM. JuR.2D Levdness, Indecency, and Obscenity § 3 (1995) (stating that obscenity is
"injurious to public morals" and involves "acts that flaunt accepted standards of conduct").
13. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power
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Supreme Court has carved out of the realm of First Amendment protection a narrow
class of speech that is particularly graphic and sexually related.' 4 The Court has
done so not by defining the concept of obscenity itself, but by defining the
parameters within which a community may find material obscene.'" Thus, while all
expression containing sexual content is not obscene, all obscene expression must
have some sexual content. 6 Furthermore, the level of explicitness or offensiveness
constituting obscenity is determined according to the values of a particular
community."
Modem obscenity doctrine revolves around the test developed by the Supreme

Court in Miller v. California." The Miller test established three criteria for
considering whether material is obscene:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.'9
The Court has refined the Miller formulation in several important ways. In Jenkins
v. Georgia ° the Court ruled that the film CarnalKnowledge2 was not obscene
under the Millertest, reversing ajury determination to the contrary.' Although the
film contained nudity and its dominant theme was sexual, the Court found that the
second Miller prong, a patently offensive portrayal of sex, was not present. 23 Thus,
mere nudity, or overt treatment of sexuality, is not obscene. In Smith v. United
States24 the Court held that legislatures may not determine the relevant "community
standards"; instead, jurors, drawing on their independent knowledge as members
of the community, can best ascertain such standards. 25 Although these rulings do not
control a court's analysis of whether communities can regulate nude dancing, they

of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....
That at any rate is the theory
of our Constitution.").
14. See infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. 50 AM. JUR.2D Lewdness, Indecency, and Obscenity § 5 (1995) ("As a matter of federal
constitutional law, obscenity is confined to sexual matters or sexual conduct. However, sex and
obscenity are not synonymous ..... (footnotes omitted)).
17. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
18. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
19. Id. at 24 (citations omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
20. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
21. (Embassy Pictures and ICARUS Prods., Inc. 1971).
22. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 154.
23. Id. at 161.
24. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
25. Id. at 300-02.
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do provide important principles.
Federal courts have been less willing to extend First Amendment protection to
expressive conduct than to pure speech. In United States v. O'Brien2 6 the Supreme
Court set out the modem test for determining what expressive conduct falls within
the protective cloak of the First Amendment." The O'Brien Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction under a statute that prohibited the destruction of a military
draft notice, even though the defendant publicly burned his draft card to express his
disapproval ofUnited States military policy. 8 In so doing, the Court enunciated the
following test for evaluating a government regulation that restricts expressive
conduct:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if
it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; ifthe governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.29
The Court further concluded that such a regulation must be examined on its face
because it is not appropriate to consider legislative history when determining
whether the purpose ofthe regulation is related to the suppression of speech.3" Not
only is such an inquiry irrelevant to the question of how the regulation is actually
enforced and understood by the public, but it is also unreliable as an indicator of
legislative intent.3 As the Supreme Court noted, "What motivates one legislator to
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to

enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork."32
The Court applied the O'Brientest to nude dancing in Barnesv. Glen Theatre,
Inc."3 The Court split 5-4, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for a three-member
plurality, Justices Scalia and Souter concurring in the judgment, and Justice White
writing for the four dissenting Justices.34 The case involved the application of an
Indiana public indecency statute to an establishment seeking to present totally nude

26. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
27. Id. at 377.
28. Id. at 369-72.
29. Id. at 377.
30. Id. at 382-85.
31. Strictly speaking, a legislative body does not act with a unified intent. Only the enacted statute
is attributable to the legislative body. Ifone can draw any inference from an ambiguous statute, it is that
the legislative body passed it in that form because none ofthe interpretations provided in the legislative
history achieved sufficient consensus to be enacted within the text of the statute.
32. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384.
33. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
34. Id. at 562.
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dancing.35 The plurality found the O'Brientest satisfied36 because it was within the
state's police power to pass such a law,37 and it was supported by a substantial
government interest in "protecting societal order and morality."3 Additionally, the
plurality found this interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression.39
Finally, the plurality used essentially the same logic to conclude that the statute was
narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose. 0 Although it is plausible that morality
supports the proscription of public nudity, it is unclear why such an interest is
categorically substantial. The determination of substantiality seems best made by
the community, which ultimately expresses its degree of moral disapproval ofpublic
nudity by enacting or not enacting laws prohibiting the conduct. In the final
analysis, a court cannot determine the strength or legitimacy of a community's
morality any better than the community itself.
Justice Souter agreed with the plurality's analysis except with respect to the
substantial interest supporting the statute. He declined to ascribe a general interest
in morality to the legislation;41 instead, he found a substantial interest, as developed
in the government's brief, in "preventing prostitution, sexual assault, and other
criminal activity."'42 Significantly, Justice Souter recognized that such an interest
was specific to this statute, and he would not necessarily support its application to
other instances ofpublic nudity.43 Justice Scalia declined to apply the O'Brientest,
reasoning that a general prohibition of conduct is not subject to First Amendment
scrutiny, even if people sometimes engage in such conduct for expressive
purposes." The dissent reasoned that only a prohibition of all nudity, regardless of
context, could truly be called "general."4 Even if the statute on its face did not
attack speech, the dissent considered its application to expressive conduct enough
to trigger the First Amendment.46
The Barnes majority, notwithstanding philosophical differences, accepted the
concept that the First Amendment's scope is finite. When individuals engage in
expression through ordinary conduct, the First Amendment does not grind the
wheels of government control to an absolute halt; instead,'the First Amendment
must yield to neutral laws that regulate such conduct. However, the four Barnes

35. Id. at 562-63. The statute broadly defines public indecency to impose misdemeanor liability
on "[a] person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place... [a]ppears in a state ofnudity." IND.
CODEANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Michie 1994).
36. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567.

37. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 568.
See id. at 571.
Id. at 571-72.
Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
Barnes, 501 U.S. at 583 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
Id.
concurring).
See id. at 572-73 (Scalia, J.,
Id. at 595 (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 596.
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opinions suggest widely divergent approaches to determining the scope of the First
Amendment with respect to nude dancing. From the standpoint of developing a
clear constitutional standard, Justice Souter's opinion is the most troubling, despite
its appeal as a pragmatic and carefully balanced solution.47 If the interest advanced
by a statute is determined according to the particular circumstances surrounding
each enforcement of it, then the interest is really being articulated by the
enforcement agency or, as Justice Souter admitted in Barnes, the attorneys for the
government." As a result, the application of a statute may be selectively and
unpredictably enforced.49
III. NUDE DANCING UNDER SOUTH CAROLINA LAW

South Carolina courts have generally followed federal courts in defining
obscenity because the South Carolina obscenity statute closely mirrors the Miller
terminology. 0 The statute clearly meets the specificity requirement in Miller and
has recently been held constitutional as applied to the lewd and lascivious behavior
of topless dancers.5 ' However, as the supreme court noted in Connor v. Town of
2 the obscenity
Hilton HeadIsland,"
statute does not prohibit nude dancing per se. 3
In Connora town passed an ordinance specifically prohibiting nude and semi-nude
dancing.54 The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld an injunction against

enforcement of the ordinance not only on First Amendment grounds but also

because the ordinance "set aside" state law on the subject of public nudity.55

47. As one commentator gushed, "Justice Souter's brand ofjudicial conservatism builds on the
virtues of careful attention to nuance and context and the disinclination to employ sweeping
propositions." Vincent Blasi, Six Conservatives in Search of the FirstAmendment: The Revealing
Case of Nude Dancing,33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 611, 654 (1992). The First Amendment, however,
is a guaranteeand may be best interpreted by "sweeping propositions" that clearly develop its scope,
rather than by tying it to specific circumstances and political considerations. Resorting to a casespecific "fairness under these circumstances" test, regardless of how favorably it may reflect on Justice
Souter's sense of caution and humility, is an abdication of the judicial branch's responsibility to "say
what the law is."
48. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
49. One major benefit of the common law judicial system is its predictability. Society is not
subject to the whims ofjudges, but to the settled, reported law. Justice Souter's viewplaces a defendant
in the position of hoping, for purposes of relying on the First Amendment, that the government is
inarticulate or unconvincing in describing its reasons for passing the law and that the judge orjury does
not find such reasons credible or socially important. See ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of United States FederalCourts in Interpretingthe Constitutionand
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 3-14 (Amy Guttman, ed., 1997).
50. See S.C. CODEANN. § 16-15-305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
51. State v. Bouye, 325 S.C. 260, 484 S.E.2d 461 (1997).
52. 314 S.C. 251,442 S.E.2d 608 (1994).
53. Id. at 254, 442 S.E.2d at 609.
54. Id. at 253, 442 S.E.2d at 609.
55. Id. at 254-56, 442 S.E.2d at 609-10.
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Accepting and applying the O'Brientest as explained in Barnes," the court found
that because the ordinance proscribed nude and semi-nude dancing specifically, it
targeted expressive conduct in violation of O'Brien's third prong. s7 More
significantly, however, in interpreting Article VIII, section 14 of the state
constitution, 8 which provides that various state laws including criminal laws not be
set aside by municipal or county ordinance, 9 the court heldthat sections 16-5-130,'
16-15-305,6' and 16-15-36562 constituted state law on the subject ofnude dancing.'"
Therefore, a municipal ordinance imposing criminal sanctions for conduct not
illegal under those code sections violates Article VIII, section 14 of the South
Carolina Constitution.' Perhaps because the First Amendment issue was so clear,
the court provided scant justification for its ruling on the state constitutional law
issue.
In Martin v. Condon6 1 the supreme court cited the Connor holding as a
controlling precedent in its decision to deny local control over state-sanctioned
gambling." The court in Martin again referred to the language of Article VIII,
section 14 to support the proposition that "local governments may not criminalize
conduct that is legal under a statewide criminal law., 6 7 Justice Jean H. Toal, in a
dissenting opinion, approved the Connor interpretation of Article VIII, section 14
despite reference to case law from various jurisdictions that permitted local
legislation expressly authorized by a state statute. 8 Justice Toal found the provision

56. Id. at 253-56, 442 S.E.2d at 609-10.
57. Id. at 255, 442 S.E.2d at 610.
58. S.C. CONST. art. VIII, § 14.
59. Id. The constitution provides that "in enacting provisions required or authorized by this
article, general law provisions applicable to the following matters shall not be set aside: ...(5)
criminal laws and the penalties and sanctions for the transgression thereof." Id.
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-130 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (indecent exposure).
61. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-15-305 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (obscenity).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-365 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (lewd and lascivious conduct).
63. Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 314 S.C. 251,254,442 S.E.2d 608, 609-10 (1994).
64. Id. at 254, 442 S.E.2d at 610.
65. 324 S.C. 183,478 S.E.2d 272 (1996). The court interpreted Article III, section 34 of the state
constitution to forbid counties from passing ordinances that ban video poker machine gambling. Id. at
187, 478 S.E.2d at 273. Section 16-19-40 of the South Carolina Code makes gambling illegal. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-19-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Coin-operated nonpayout machines, however, are
exempted by section 16-9-60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-19-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). Although
statutory law had allowed counties to "opt out" of the state law exemption and forbid these machines,
S.C. CODEANN. § 12-21-2806 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997), the Martin court held that
this was unconstitutional "special legislation" under Article III, section 34 because it effectively
criminalized conduct in some counties that was legal elsewhere in the state. Martin,324 S.C. at 186-87,
478 S.E.2d at 273.
66. Martin, 324 S.C. at 188, 478 S.E.2d at 274.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 194,478 S.E.2d at 277 (Toal, J., dissenting) ("I do not cite these cases to suggest that
municipalities always may, on their own, absent a general law pemitting local option, enact criminal
ordinances outlawing alcohol and gambling; S.C. Const. art. VIII, § 14 likely prohibits such criminal
ordinances.").
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irrelevant, however, based on her conclusion that the legislation at issue was not a

criminal law.69 Thus, while agreeing with the majority's approval of Connor,Justice
Toal found that the decision did not apply to legislation enacted for a regulatory

purpose.7" Notwithstanding its approval by four members of the court, Justice E.C.
Burnett, III, decisively rejected the Connorholding in his concurrence, writing that,
in his opinion, "the Connorcourt erred.... [T]he court effectively provides that all
conduct is lawful unless made unlawful by enactment of the General Assembly.
Article VIII, § 14, does not yield to such an interpretation."'" Although no Justice
dissented in Connor72 and reliance on the case was unnecessary to the outcome in
Martin, Justice Burnett rejected its use as precedent in any context.73
InDiamondsv. GreenvilleCounty74 the supreme court again affirmed Connor,75
this time providing a more thorough explanation of its ruling. In Diamonds a nude
dancing establishment challenged a Greenville County ordinance which, like the
Indiana law in Barnes, prohibited public nudity.76 The South Carolina Supreme
Court began its analysis by noting that, under Barnes, it must first determine
whether the county had the power to enact the statute. 77 Because the combination
of sections 16-15-130, 16-15-305, and 16-15-365 constituted a criminal law
"scheme" covering public nudity, the constitutional mandate that state criminal law
69. Id.at 195, 478 S.E.2d at 278 ("The local option statute is part of [a] regulatory scheme. S.C.
CONST. art. VIII, § 14 does not concern regulatory statutes ....
Article VIII, § 14 is not relevant to this
case.").
70. Id. Of course, the definition of "regulatory" may prove elusive given that the "regulatory
scheme" at issue in Martinwould have exposed those not in compliance to up to a year in prison or a
$2000 fine. S.C. CODE § 16-19-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
71. Id. at 190, 478 S.E.2d at 275-76 (Burnett, J., concurring).
72. Justice Burnettjoined the court after the Connordecision. Lisa Greene & Cindi Ross Scoppe,
Burnett Rises to High Court,THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 22, 1995, at Al.
73. Martin, 324 S.C. at 190,478 S.E.2d at 275-76 (Burnett, J., concurring).

74. 325 S.C. 154, 480 S.E.2d 718 (1997).
75. Id. at 157-58, 480 S.E.2d at 719-20.
76. Id. at 155 n.1, 480 S.E.2d at 718 n.I. The relevant portion of the ordinance made it
"unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally appear nude in a public
place or in any other place that is readily visible to the public. It shall also be
unlawful for any person or entity maintaining, owning, or operating any public
place to knowingly, or with reason to know, permit or allow any person to appear
in a state of nudity in such public place."
Id. (quoting GREENVILLE COUNTY, S.C., ORDINANCE 2727 (June 27, 1995)). The ordinance exempted
"non-live performances" and
"[tihe conduct of being nude when it constitutes a part of a bona fide live
communication, demonstration or performance by a person wherein such nudity
is expressive conduct incidental to and necessary for the conveyance or
communication ofa genuine message or public expression and is not a mere guise
or pretense utilized to exploit the conduct of being nude for profit or commercial
gain and as such is protected by the United States or South Carolina Constitution
or (ii) it is otherwise protected by the United States or South Carolina
Constitution."

Id.
77. Id. at 156, 480 S.E.2d at 719.
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not be set aside foreclosed counties and municipalities from criminalizing any
conduct not covered by state law.78 Finding that the ordinance was unconstitutional
under Article III, section 14 of the South Carolina Constitution, the court ended its
analysis.'9
In support of its position, the court quoted a report by the West Committee,
which had proposed Article VIII, section 14.80 The West Committee commented
that .'there are certain fundamentals related to freedom which should be treated
only by the State and should not be left to local variation or abuse.'' The court
also cited atreatise on the state constitution for the proposition that a major concern
of the committee was the criminalization by local governments of conduct not
criminal under state law. 2 Referring to recent case law, the court announced "that
we have consistently interpreted [Article VIII, section 14] broader than only
prohibiting local governments from adopting ordinances that conflict with state
general law."8 3
The majority's reference to the West Committee report is perplexing,
particularly in light of then-Justice Burger's admonition in O'Brienthat legislative
history is of dubious value in this area.8 4 Although instructive, Justice Burger's
observations about federal statutory interpretation do not bind South Carolina's
highest court in the interpretation of its own constitution. The West Committee,
whatever its influence, did not ratify Article VIII, section 14.85 Thus, its use in
interpreting the constitutional provision should be limited to the actual text drafted
by the committee.
When the language ("set aside") is inconsistent with a totalprohibition on local
criminal laws, the use of extrinsic material can only mislead. In other words, the
Diamonds majority used the reference to the West Committee report8 6 not to

78. Id. at 157-59, 480 S.E.2d at 720.
79. Id.
80. Diamonds, 325 S.C. at 157-59, 480 S.E.2d at 720.
81. Id. (quotingCoMMiTrEETMAKEASTUDYOFTHESUTHCAROLINACONSTITUTIONOF 1895,
FINAL REPORT 91 (1969) (referred to as the "West Committee" because of its chairman, thenLieutenant Governor John C. West)).
82. Id. at 158,480 S.E.2d at 720 (citing 2 JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF

SoUTm CAROLINA 134 (1989)).
83. Id. (citing Davis v. County of Greenville, 322 S.C. 73, 470 S.E.2d 94 (1996); Robinson v.
Richland County Council, 293 S.C. 27, 358 S.E.2d 392 (1987)).
84. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-85 (1968).
85. See S.C. CONsT. art. XVI, § 1 (mandating that a majority of qualified electors vote in favor
of a provision, followed by formal ratification of the provision in the General Assembly by a majority
vote).
86. Even if accepted as a valid guide, the reference is quite general. The language quoted suggests
that statewide uniformity was a general goal of the committee; however, the committee may not have
meant to promote that goal by excluding all others. Public nudity may not have been one ofthe "certain
fundamentals related to freedom" that the committee felt compelled to protect from "local variation or
abuse." Diamonds, 325 S.C. at 158, 480 S.E.2d at 720 (quoting COMMITrEETO MAKE A STUDY OFTHE
SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTIONOF 1895, FINALREPORT 91 (1969)). More likely, those fundamentals
are determined by the General Assembly when it passes laws dealing with a specific topic and, thus,
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supplement vague language, but to convert a phrase with one meaning into a
contrary proposition." Similarly, the reference to Professor James L. Underwood's
treatise merely reflects a general goal of some members of the West Committee and
does not support the conclusion that Article VIII, section 14 reflects that goal.88
Indeed, the discussion ofthe constitutional provision quoted by the court 9 indicates

that the Connor-Diamonds interpretation was at the outer fringe. Professor
Underwood noted that "[s]ome commentary even evidences opposition to local
government's enacting criminal legislation at all, even if it would not contradict an
existing state general law or constitutional provision."9 The majority opinion is
therefore not so firmly grounded in precedent as it appears. Excepting Connor, the
court had no reason to give the actual language of Article VIII, section 14 such
short shrift. The court provided no guidance on how to identify a statewide scheme
when, as here, the General Assembly did not expressly designate such a scheme.
Such ambiguity is not only troubling in this case, but it also unnecessarily muddies
the waters in other areas in which state legislators and local lawmakers are left to
speculate whether or not a scheme actually exists.
Justice Toal concurred in the judgment and observed that the court had not
adopted a position inconsistent with her opinion in Martin.9 ' Rather than revisiting
her regulatory-scheme-versus-criminal-law paradigm from Martin, Justice Toal
relied on the General Assembly's occupation of the particular field of criminal law
at issue in which it had "evinced a plain intent that the question of public nudity be
treated uniformly throughout South Carolina."' Justice Toal's concurrence leaves

intentionallygives effect to Article VIII, section 14.
87. If for instance, a statute or constitution uses the term "good faith," the understanding of the
term in the context of the document's ratification or enactment is highly relevant. If the document
instead uses "honesty in fact," it is irrelevant that some or all ratifiers previously expressed that they
meant to imply the broader "good faith" concept because the language is not ambiguous. Essentially,
if legislative history must be consulted, courts should do so only when the textual language, when read
in isolation,could reasonably take on the meaning suggested by the legislative history.
88. Id. (quoting 2 JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 134

(1989)).
89. Id.
90. 2 JAMES LOWELL UNDERWOOD, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 133 (1989). In
addition, Professor Underwood offered this observation:
A key point on which further guidance is needed is whether the section 14
list consists of topics as to which local provisions are prohibited only if they
contradict or "set aside" general law provisions or do they constitute topics that
are taboo for local ordinances or special legislation even when state law is silent
on the subject because they are topics demanding uniform treatment, or no
treatment at all? The language of the section suggests the former interpretation
but some of the committee deliberations might suggest the broader meaning.
Id. at 139. Thus, the Diamonds ruling rests on what Professor Underwood predicted "some of the
committee deliberations... might suggest" in spite of contrary language in the text. Id. (emphasis
added).
91. Diamonds, 325 S.C. at 159, 480 S.E.2d at 721 (Toal, J., concurring in judgment).
92. Id.
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many questions unanswered. Although Justice Toal placed the phrase "occupied the
field" in quotation marks,93 she did not explain how to determine whether or not the
General Assembly has occupied a field, what constitutes a field, or what the
relevant field was in this case. As Justice Burnett noted in his dissent,94 the supreme
court has already addressed the first two issues.9" The Connor-Diamondsdoctrine,
however, requires that the laws themselves manifest far less (perhaps no) legislative
intent to preempt. Nevertheless, some standard is necessary so that courts can
determine when Article VIII, section 14 forecloses a criminal law field from local
government action and so that legislators can avoid inadvertently occupying a field.
-Neither the majority opinion nor Justice Toal's concurrence provides such a
standard.
Curiously, Justice Toal also did not address why a public nudity ban is criminal
and a video poker ban is regulatory. Perhaps because video poker exists only by the
grace of state legislative exemption,' any restriction is clearly regulatory whereas
a public nudity prohibition is clearly criminal. This conclusion is questionable,
however, because a ban on public nudity is arguably more characteristic of a health
and safety regulation, as it seeks to protect public morals, than it is a scheme to
catch and punish social deviants. Particularly as applied to nude dancing, a public
' dancing, but
nudity law functions in a regulatory manner; it does not ban "erotic" 97
9
merely requires that the dancers not be completely nude. Justice Toal was not clear
on why local restriction of nude dancing is criminal and local restriction of
gambling is merely regulation, when state law prohibits neither gambling nor nude
dancing.
In Diamonds Justice Burnett dissented, 9 again rejecting Connorand pointing
out that the "plain and ordinary meaning" of the term "set aside" does not suggest
that any state law preempts local criminal laws in the same area.' Rather, he
construed the state constitution as requiring a local ordinance not to be so contrary
to a state law that application of one would contradict the other.' Thus, Justice

93. Id. at 159, 480 S.E.2d at 720.
94. Id. at 161-62, 480 S.E.2d at 723 (Burnett, J., dissenting).
95. Town of Hilton Head Island v. Fine Liquors, Ltd., 302 S.C. 550, 552, 397 S.E.2d 662, 663
(1990) ("[I]n order to pre-empt an entire field, an act must make manifest a legislative intent that no
other enactment may touch upon the subject in any way."). Under this standard, the language ofthe act
itselfimust express preemptive intent; in contrast, the doctrine enunciated in Diamondsrelies on judicial

intuition.
96. S.C. CODEANN. § 16-19-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
97. The author uses quotation marks here because eroticism is a matter of personal taste, and
many people consider nude barroom dancing neither tasteful nor erotic.
98. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,563 (1991) (statute requires dancers to wear
"pasties" and "G-strings").
99. Diamonds v. Greenville County, 325 S.C. 154, 160-62, 480 S.E.2d 718, 721-22 (Burnett, J.,
dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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Burnett's position was consistent with his concurrence in Martin v. Condon10 2
because inDiamondsthe only provision of the state constitution at issue was Article
VIII, section 14, which he disclaimed as the basis for his agreement with the Martin
majority. 3 In DiamondsJustice Burnett claimed that the majority's position would
eviscerate the power of local governments to pass any criminal law by requiring that
the absence of a state criminal statute be conclusive evidence of a legislative
decision that particular conduct should not be criminal."'° Therefore, under the
majority's ruling, Article VIII, section 14 gives broad preemptive effect to various
criminal laws based not on thetext of the laws themselves but on what the supreme
court assumes the legislature deliberately excluded. Justice Burnett's consistent
opposition to such a rule is laudable. When the text of the constitution is
unambiguous, the court should not ignore its plain meaning in its attempt to draw
a bright-line rule in this area by relying on inconclusive legislative history.
Ultimately, Justice Burnett's interpretation of Article VIII, section 14 is the most
faithful to the constitutional language.
IV. FRAMING ALEGITIMATE FORM OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER NUDE
DANCING

When a government proscribes private action to silence a disfavored message,
it censors speech-regardless of the circumstances. However, just as the
government damages the interests the First Amendment protects whenever it
silences speech, the government cheapens those interests when it excuses socially
harmful conduct because some individual may engage in such conduct to express
an idea. With this in mind, the government should adopt a policy of regulating nude
dancing that balances the values of free speech, personal autonomy, and local
sovereignty. Moreover, nude dancing should be left to the local authorities to
regulate in a manner that does not unduly compromise the Federal Constitution; the
individual; or the sovereignty of federal, state, or local governments.
Courts have properly rejected viewpoint-based challenges to nude dancing as
impermissible under the First Amendment 5 and have found that the obscenity
doctrine cannot be used to prohibit all forms of nude dancing.' 6 In Barnes the
United States Supreme Court recognized a legitimate form of local control over
nude dancing. The Court held that public nudity, proscribed for hundreds of years
in many states, is within the sphere of conduct that local governments can restrict

102.
103.
104.
105.

324 S.C. 183, 189-90, 478 S.E.2d 272, 275-76 (1996) (Burnett, J., concurring).
Id.
Diamonds,325 S.C. at 161, 480 S.E.2d at 722 (Burnett, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking

down ordinance banning pornography defined in terms of "subordination of women" in words or
pictures).
106. See, e.g., State v. Bean, 327 S.C. 589, 592,490 S.E.2d 16, 17-18 (1997) (recognizing that
only obscene nude dancing violates the South Carolina criminal law).
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in the name of public morals.' "° The Barnesmajority did not hold that public nudity
or the sale of such nudity was immoral; instead, the Court merely concluded that a
community which considered public nudity immoral could enforce their view
through laws without violating the Constitution.' 8 Indeed, since Miller, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the need for communities to prescribe their own
standards.'0 9 This local solution is even more appropriate in the context of public
nudity because speech is only incidental to the conduct.
The relationship between the First Amendment and sexually explicit conduct
is not a direct one. Conduct that conveys an expressive message has two faces. First,
such conduct is private action, susceptible to regulation under the broad powers of
state government." ' Second, it is speech, and as speech the First Amendment
protects it from all but the most narrow government restriction."' Laws that
specifically ban or restrict nudity in the context of performance dancing clearly
express disapproval of what it communicates." 2 In contrast, general public nudity
laws are indifferent to whether an individual is communicating a message by being
nude. Therefore, legislative history or any other evidence which suggests that the
purpose of a law is really to censor nude dancing should not disqualify such laws.
They apply uniformly to public nudity, and because public nudity is not speech," 3
such laws are not directed at speech.
Passing a general law for specific reasons, such as intentionally restricting
conduct that has been used for speech, should not be unconstitutional. The law may
simply express a community's moral opposition to the conduct or its willingness to
oppose the conduct generally and to restrict its use in expressing an idea. If a
general law was unconstitutional because it had an incidental effect on protected
speech, then a government could not enact a general law that proscribed conduct
which is within a government's power to prohibit after a person engaged in such
conduct to express an idea. For instance, suppose a community passed a "no
jaywalking" law and a group of citizens decided to jaywalk on Main Street every
Saturday to advance the cause of "pedestrian rights." The First Amendment cannot
come in and displace the government's previously undisputed power to prohibit
107. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-70 (1991).

108. Id.
109. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see also Hefner, supra note 10, at 850-53
(describing the judicial evolution of "community standards").
110. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60 (1973) ("[TMhe proper course is
to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by some
express prohibition in the constitution of the United States or of the State ...... (quoting Tyson &
Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
111. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
112. See, e.g., Connor v. Town of Hilton Head Island, 314 S.C. 251,255, 442 S.E.2d 608, 610
(1994) ("[The] Town's ban on nudity is directly related to the suppression of nude dancing which it
specifically targets.").
113. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,570 (1991) ("It could be argued..., that almost
limitless types of conduct-including appearing in the nude in public-are expressive .... But the court
[has] rejected this expansive notion of 'expressive conduct' .... ").
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jaywalking. But opponents of public nudity statutes, such as the dissenters in
Barnes,11 4 embrace just such a proposition. They fail to realize that nudity does not
become speech just because it sometimes accompanies speech. Whether people
engage in nudity to "enhance" (in this context, to make more profitable) public
performance should not be a First Amendment weapon that can be used against
local sovereignty. Under the majority opinion in Barnes, it is not.
The South Carolina Supreme Court has erected a different barrier to local
control. The court's construction of Article VIII, section 14 of the South Carolina
Constitution under Diamonds and Connor is not faithful to the language of the
document. The Constitution cedes lawmaking authority to local governments in all
the areas listed in section 14 with the qualification that they not set aside state
law." 5 Rather than proclaim these areas the province of state control only, as it
easily could have done, the section leaves room for local authority. Nonetheless, the
court found that a local ordinance prohibiting public nudity would set aside a state
statutory "scheme" consisting of a number of laws scattered throughout the code
chapter, "Offenses Against Morality and Decency.""' 6 None of these laws, taken
singly or together, support an inference that the General Assembly found public
nudity such an important right that it should not be subject to local control. On the
contrary, this group of statutes more appropriately constitutes a "bare minimum" of
laws restricting nudity and pornography when local governments choose not to
address the topic. Because attitudes toward nude dancing may vary widely across
the state," 7 the General Assembly probably did not consider the issue appropriate
for a statewide scheme. Certainly, the Legislature could not have intended that these
three scattered statutes be used as a shield against local control over public nudity.
The South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation of Article VIII, section 14
places severe restrictions on the regulation of public nudity in this state. The Court
renders the Barnes opinion moot not by deliberately extending greater protection
to public nudity, but by reading local government sovereignty out of the South
Carolina Constitution. Civil libertarians should refrain from celebration. Such a
strained reading does not stand for the proposition that nude dancing is expressive
speech beyond the scope of government power; instead, it means that the General
Assembly's moral choices are binding upon all local communities, even in areas of
distinctly local concern. Community standards that are constitutionally enforced in
the area of obscenity' are now treated as irrelevant in the context of public nudity.
Such a reading of the state constitution is a serious hindrance to local autonomy and

114. Id. at 587-96 (White, J., dissenting).
115. S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 14.
116. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-130, -305, -365 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).

117. Joseph S. Stroud, Assembly's Geography Shaping its Morality?, THE STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), May 31, 1998, at Al (reporting that the General Assembly is dominated by geographic
differences in moral views).
118. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 302 (1977) (holding that legislatures may not
determine the relevant community standards).
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should be reconsidered as suggested by Justice Burnett's dissent in Diamonds."9
IV. CONCLUSION

The views of the Barnes dissenters and the Diamonds majority act as a barrier
to local restrictions on nude dancing. Both approaches evidence a distrust of local
majority rule-a paternalistic impulse to correct the moral calculus of society. The
Barnes dissenters directly asserted that a ban on public nudity is an inferior policy
choice because a ban may diminish the "message of eroticism" that nude dancers
seek to convey. In contrast, the Diamonds majority buried its policy preference by
citing legislative history and then suggesting, contrary to the constitution's
language, that local control over such matters has always been withheld by a
statewide scheme of obscenity laws. Both approaches are practically and
philosophically flawed. In South Carolina, local communities are left chasing nude
dancing businesses with zoning laws and waiting for the General Assembly to
delegate to them a power which, on the face of the constitution, has already been
delegated.
This Note does not argue that local governments should ban public nudity;
instead, local governments should be given the discretion to exercise such control
if the community so desires-a flexible approach that facilitates diversity,
compromise, and the development of solutions to fit each community. When a
community places a high value on civil liberties or the economic value of nude
performance, it can permit public nudity as allowed by state law. If a community
determines that public morals are undermined by public nudity, it can require that
erotic dancers and everyone else be covered by a bare minimum of clothing. In
either case, the decision is made through open and democratic community
policymaking, not through the extraconstitutional policy choices of state judges.
Jeffrey P. Dunlaevy

119. Diamonds v. Greenville County, 325 S.C. 154, 161-62, 480 S.E.2d 718, 721-22 (1997)
(Burnett, J., dissenting).
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SOUTH CAROLINA BANS PARTIAL-BIRTH
ABORTIONS
Abortion is a unique act. It is an actfraught with consequences
for others: for the woman who must live with the implicationsof
her decision; for the persons who perform and assist in the
procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must
confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures
some deem nothing short of an act of violence againstinnocent
human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or
potentiallife that is aborted.*

L

INTRODUCTION

On March 26, 1997, South Carolina Governor David Beasley approved a bill
banning partial-birth abortions.' South Carolina's ban makes the performance of a
partial-birth abortion a felony and creates a cause of action for the father and
maternal grandparents, unless the plaintiff consented to the abortion or the
pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff's criminal conduct.2 The plaintiffs are entitled
* Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
1. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
2. Id. § 44-41-85(A), (C)(1). This section provides:
(A) A physician who knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and
thereby kills a human fetus is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be
fined not less than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for not less than five years,
or both. This section shall not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary
to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, a
physical illness, or a physical injury if no other medical procedure would suffice
for that purpose.
(3) As used in this section:
(1) the term "partial-birth abortion" means an abortion in which the
person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus
before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.
(2) the term "physician" means a physician, surgeon, or osteopath
authorized to practice medicine in this State and licensed pursuant to
Chapter 47 ofTitle 40. However, an individual who is not a physician, but
Who directly and knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion is also subject
to the provisions of this section.
(C)(1) The father, if married to the mother at the time she receives a partialbirth abortion, and if the mother has not attained the age of eighteen years
at the time of the abortion, the maternal grandparents of the fetus have a
cause of action against the physician or other person unlawfully performing
a partial-birth abortion and may obtain appropriate relief, unless the
pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff's criminal conduct or the plaintiff

1041
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to relief that includes treble actual damages, punitive damages, and reasonable costs
and attorney's fees.3 Mothers are exempt from both civil and criminal liability for
violating the statute.4
Partial-birth abortion legislation raises several important issues that this Note
will consider.' Part II places South Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban in context
with other such bans. Part III explains the framework for reviewing the
constitutionality of laws regulating abortion, a framework that has changed
markedly over the past twenty years in allowing states to regulate abortions more
stringently than in the past. Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of South
Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban in light of recent federal court opinions striking
down similar statutes in other states.
II. BACKGROUND: THE SOUTH CAROLINAPARTIAL-BIRTHABORTION STATUTEIN

CONTEXT
Several abortion procedures are available for women in the latter stages of
preguancy.6 The South Carolina General Assembly politely describes the procedure
at issue, the partial-birth abortion, "as an abortion in which the person performing
the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and
completing the delivery." 7 The procedure is known in the medical profession as

consented to the abortion.
(2) Such relief includes, but is not limited to:
(a) actual damages which shall be trebled;
(b) punitive damages for all injuries, psychological and physical,
occasioned by the violation of this section; and
(c) reasonable costs and attorney's fees.
(D) A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed may not be
prosecuted for a violation of this section, for a conspiracy to violate this section,
or for any other offense which is based on a violation of this section.
Id. § 44-41-85.
3. Id. § 44-41-85(C)(2).
4. Id. § 44-41-85(D). Rhode Island has enacted a similar statute that purports to give the aborting
mother a cause of action against the physician; however, this provision only applies to plaintiffs that
did not give their consent to the procedure. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12-4 (Supp. 1997). As a result, few
women would ever have a cause of action.
5. Issues regarding the statute's damages provisions are beyond the scope of this Note.
6. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (Supp. 1997). The code section lists other procedures
available throughout pregnancy: dilation and evacuation, "involving dismemberment prior to
removal[;] the suction curettage procedure, [and] the suction aspiration procedure" (mainly used in
abortions early in the pregnancy); and the saline abortion procedure, in which the pregnancy is
terminated by performance of an "amniocentesis and injection of saline into the amniotic sac within
the uterine cavity." Id. § 76-7-310.5(1)(a)-(b). The medical community recognizes the terms "intact
dilation and evacuation," "intact dilation and extraction," and "dilation and extraction" for "partialbirth abortion." The three medical terms will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
7. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-85(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). More specifically, the procedure,
which requires three days to accomplish, begins with a two-day period of cervical dilation. The woman
is sent home overnight while her cervix dilates. Upon returning to the clinic, the physician or an
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"Intact Dilation and Extraction," which contains the following four elements:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

deliberate dilation of the cervix, generally over a sequence of days;
instrumental conversion of the fetus to a footling breech;
breech extraction of the body excepting the head; and
partial evacuation ofthe intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect
vaginal delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.'

The trend to ban partial-birth abortions began with the passage of two bills by the
United States Congress, both of which were vetoed by President Clinton.9 President
Clinton vetoed the bills because they lacked an exception for use of the procedure
when it would be necessary to avoid serious health consequences. ° Representative
Charles T. Canady, a Republican from Florida, sponsored the most recent federal

partial-birth abortion bill and vows that he will work tirelessly to get the votes
needed to override the veto next session."
Despite President Clinton's vetoes and concern regarding the absence of a

health exception, many states, including South Carolina, have followed Congress's
lead and have enacted legislation banning partial-birth abortions. At least sixteen
states have enacted such legislation,

2

and twenty-one other states have considered

assistant breaks the woman's water. The physician places the baby into a breach birth position and then
pulls the baby by its legs through the cervix and into the vagia. Just as the head reaches the vagina,
the physician punctures the base of the baby's skull with a sharp instrument and inserts a suction device
to remove the brain contents, thereby killing the fetus and allowing the collapse of its skull. The
delivery is then completed. Partial-BirthAbortions(Dr. Curtis Cook, Congressional Testimony, Mar.
11, 1997), available in 1997 WL 8221117. Doctor Cook is a board-certified obstetrician/gynecologist
who has a subspecialty in high risk obstetrics. Id.
Planned Parenthood claims that there is no such thing as a "partial-birth abortion," calling it a
political term rather than a medical term. Planned Parenthood Federation of American, Inc. Web Site
(visited June 19, 1998) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org>.
8. Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction, ACOG STATEMENT OF POL'Y (Am. C. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 12, 1997, at I [hereinafter ACOG STATEMENT].
9. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1995, H.R. 1833, 104th Cong. (1995) (vetoed on April
9,1996); Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 1997, H.R. 1122, 106th Cong. (1997) (vetoed on October
10, 1997).
10. See William J. Clinton, White House Press Release Database: To the House of
Representatives(visited June 19, 1998) <http:llwww.whitehouse.govWH/htmlllibrary.html>.
11. Charles T. Canady, Canady Responds to PresidentClinton'sAbortion Veto (Government
Press Release, Oct. 10, 1997), available in 1997 WL 12103678.
12. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-1 to -6 (Supp. 1997); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050 (Michie Supp.
1997); ARiz. REV. STAT.ANN. § 13-3603.01 (West Supp. 1997); ARK. CODEANN. § 5-61-203 (Michie
1997); Act of July 1, 1997,1997 Ga. Laws 979 (to be codified at GEORGIA CODEANN. § 16-22-144);
IND. CODEANN. § 16-18-2-267.5, 16-34-2-1, 16-34-2-7 (Michie Supp. 1997); 1998 Iowa Legis. Serv.
2073 (to be codified at IOwACODE § 707.8A); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 1299.35.16 (West 1998); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.17016 (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-71 to -73 (Supp. 1997);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-328 (1997); 1998 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 262 (West) (conditional veto by
Governor returned to General Assembly and law enacted by veto override Dec. 15, 1997); R.I. GEN.
LAws §§ 23-4.12-2 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34-23A-27 to 34-23A-32 (Michie Supp. 1997);
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doing so.' 3 The state statutes banning partial-birth abortions vary-some impose
criminal penalties on physicians,' 4 and some impose criminal penalties and provide
civil remedies for the father or maternal grandparents.' 5 Physicians have already
begun seeking preliminary injunctions claiming that statutes banning partial-birth
abortions are unconstitutional.' 6 At publication, no one has challenged the
constitutionality of South Carolina's statute.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ABORTION
REGULATIONS

Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we
suppose some always shall disagree,about the profound moral

§ 39-15-209 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (Supp. 1997); see also H.R.
135, 121st Leg., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1995). The Ohio statute banning partial-birth abortion is
currently under injunction. See Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998).
13. See S. 102, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997); H.R. 1136, 61st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 1997); H.R. 211, 139th G.A. (Del. 1997); H.R. 1227, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1997) (vetoed by
Governor on May 23, 1997); H.R. 1460,19th Leg. (Haw. 1997); H.R. 2509, 77th Leg., 1997 Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 1997); S. 121, Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1996); H.R. 390, 118th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 1997); S. 875,
181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1997); S. 1502, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1997); S. 275, 89th
Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1997) (vetoed by governor on July 7, 1997); H.R. 937, 89th Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1998); H.R. 78, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 1997); S. 8875, 221st Leg., Ann.
Sess. (N.Y. 1998); S. 536, 1997-98 Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1997); H.R. 2201, 46th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Okla. 1997); S. 1132,69th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1997); H.R. 470,64th Leg., Biennial Sess. (Vt.
1997); H.R. 2898, 1997 Sess. (Va. 1997); S. 5441, 55th Leg., IstReg. Sess. (Wash. 1997); H.R. 2773,
73d Leg. (,V. Va. 1997); S. 131, 93d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Vis. 1997).
14. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050 (Michie Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal penalties); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-61-203 (Michie 1997) (imposing criminal penalties); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-18-2267.5, 16-34-2-1, 16-34-2-7 (Michie Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal penalties); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-71 to -73 (Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal penalties); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-328 (Supp.
1997) (imposing criminal penalties); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997) (imposing criminal
penalties); UTAH CODEANN. § 76-7-310.5 (Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal penalties).
15. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-21-3,-5 (Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal penalties and providing civil
remedies); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (West Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal penalties and
providing civil remedies); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.16 (Vest Supp. 1998) (imposing criminal
penalties and providing civil remedies); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.17016 (Vest Supp. 1997)
(imposing criminal penalties and providing civil remedies); RI. GEN. LAws §§ 23-4.12-4, -5 (Supp.
1997) (imposing criminal penalties and providing civil remedies); S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34-23A-27
to 34-23A-32 (Michie Supp. 1997) (imposing criminal penalties and providing civil remedies).
16. See, e.g., Women's Med. Prof'I Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1093 (S.D. Ohio
1995), affld, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998). In 1996 the United
States District Court for the Southern District ofOhio found that the plaintiffdemonstrated asubstantial
likelihood on the merits that Ohio is not constitutionally permitted to ban the dilation and extraction
procedure. As a result, the court enjoined the Ohio statutes's ban on the procedure. See id. at 1094.
Similarly, in Carhartv.Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997), the United States District Court
for the District ofNebraska found a Nebraska statute banning partial-birth abortions unconstitutional
because, under the standard established in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), it
imposes an "undue burden" on women seeking abortions. Carhart,972 F. Supp. at 509.
TENN. CODE ANN.
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andspiritualimplications ofterminatinga pregnancy,even in its
earlieststage.Some ofus as individualsfind abortionoffensive to
our most basicprinciplesof morality, but thatcannot control our
decision. Our obligation is to7 define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code.'
A.

UnitedStates Supreme Court Case Law RegardingAbortionRegulations

Twenty-five years ago in Roe v. Wade,'" the United States Supreme Court
established a rigid framework for abortion regulation based on trimesters of the
gestation period. 9 Through the Court's more recent decision in Planned

Parenthoodv.Casey,2" this framework has now unraveled so that the attainment of
viability serves as the critical point "at which the State's interest in fetal life is
constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.""
The abortion controversy gained constitutional stature in Roe v. Wade, in which
the Supreme Court held that a woman's interest prevails in the early stages of
pregnancy, but the state's interest in protecting the life of the unborn is significantly
involved and strengthens as the pregnancy progresses.' Although the Constitution
does not expressly mention a right of privacy, under either the Fourteenth
Amendment's concept of individual liberty or in the reservation of rights to the
people in the Ninth Amendment, the right to privacy exists and is broad enough to
include a woman's reproductive decisions.' This right is not absolute, however, and
a woman is not "entitled to terminate her pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever
way, and for whatever reason she alone chooses."'24 This qualified right to choose
must be weighed against the compelling state interest in regulating the procedure.'
In addition to recognizing a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion,

Roe v. Wade announced a system for accommodating that right and the legitimate
interest of the state in protecting the woman's health and the potential life of the
unborn. 2 6 During the first trimester, the state cannot restrict a woman's choice to
have an abortion; the decision to terminate a pregnancy during this trimester is made

17. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19. Id. at 164-65.

20. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
21. Id. at 860. In Casey the Court noted that "[ain entire generation has come of age free to
assume Roe's concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to make
reproductive decisions." Id.
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 164-65.
23. Id. at 152-53. The rights established in Roe v. Wade may now rest solely on the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of liberty. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment establishes that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
25. Id. at 154.
26. Id. at 155.
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by the physician in consultation with the pregnant woman. The state's interest
grows as the pregnancy progresses. During the second trimester, the state's interest
in the health of the mother permits state regulation of the "abortion procedure to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of
maternal health."2 The Court held that viability is the point at which the state's
important interest in prenatal life becomes "compelling."2' 9 Viability roughly
coincides with the beginning of the third trimester. Subsequent to viability, the
state's interest in protecting the fetus has both logical and biological justifications
because the fetus has the potential of surviving outside of the mother's womb.30 To
promote its interest in protecting the fetus after viability, the state may ban postviability abortions not performed to preserve the mother's life or health."
In the years between Roe v. Wade and Casey, the Supreme Court struck "down
abortion regulations that [were] not designed to protect the pregnant woman, to
protect pregnant minors, to promote informed decisions by pregnant women, or to
protect a viable or possibly viable fetus."32 The Supreme Court's decision in
3 3 is a significant post-Roe v. Wade, pre-Casey
PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth
decision because it is the only Supreme Court case that has considered the
constitutionality of banning a particular procedure. In Danforththe Court struck
down a ban of the saline amniocentesis procedure because this procedure would
inhibit the vast majority of abortions performed after the first trimester"4 and require
a woman to undergo an abortion method more dangerous to her health.35
Almost twenty years after Roe v. Wade, in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, the
Court rejected the rigid trimester framework. 6 The Casey Court reaffirmed the
essential holding of Roe v. Wade that a woman has a "right to terminate her

27. Id. at 163. The physician and the pregnant woman should consider several factors in their
consultation, including the following: the woman's mental and physical health; the distress associated
with the unwanted child; the inability, psychologically and otherwise, for the family to care for the
child; and, in some cases the stigma attached to unwed mothers. Id. at 153.
28. Id. at 163. The Courtstated that permissible state regulations ofabortion include requirements
as to the qualifications of the abortion provider and the facility where the procedure is to be performed.

Id.
29. Id. A fetus is "viable" when it is potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, even if
artificial means are necessary to sustain its life. Twenty-four weeks was the earliest point of viability
mentioned by the Court. Id. at 160. However, technological advances necessarily vary the time-frame
forviability. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (stating that future respiratory
advances may decrease the point of viability).
30. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
31. Id. at 163-64.
32. 3 RONALDD.ROTUNDA&JOHNE.NO\VAX, TREAnSEONCONSTTTIONALLAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 18.29, at 92 (2d ed. 1992).
33. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

34. Id. at 77-79.
35. Id. at 78.
36. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992). Although the Court acknowledged
that the viability line is arbitrary, the line contains a certain element of fairness because "a woman who
fails to act before viability has consented to the State's intervention" on behalf of the fetus. Id. at 870.
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pregnancy before viability, 3 7 but the State has an increasingly important interest in
protecting the fetus so that it may even proscribe post-viability, non-therepeutic
abortions. 8 Instead of Roe v. Wade's rigid trimester framework, the Court used
viability as the line of demarcation.39 To provide guidelines for determining whether
post-viability regulations on abortions are constitutional, the Casey Court
implemented an undue burden test.4" Under this standard, a statute regulating
abortion is an undue burden if it
has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this
purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the
interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it.4
A state regulation serving a valid purpose will not be struck down solely
because it has the secondary effect of hindering a woman's ability to obtain an
abortion.42 Instead, only when "state regulation imposes an undue burden on a
woman's ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the
heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause."43 As far as the regulation
of medical procedures is concerned, the State can exercise its power to restrict
abortions in almost any way after the point of viability; however, prior to viability
the state may regulate medical procedures only to further the health or safety of the
woman.' Unnecessary health regulations that substantially restrain a woman from
terminating her pregnancy unduly burden her right of choice.45 In light of Roe v.
Wade and Casey, may South Carolina enact legislation regulating a specific
abortion procedure? The answer is a qualified "yes." Legislatures must enact
regulations of pre-viability abortion procedures with the purpose of promoting
maternal health and must not place an undue burden on the woman's choice to have
an abortion. Restrictions of any kind are allowed after viability if exceptions for the
life and health of the mother are provided. Although mainly utilized when the fetus
is viable, a physician may recommend and perform a partial-birth abortion before
viability. 6 South Carolina's ban on partial-birth abortions is problematic because
it proscribes the procedure regardless of whether the fetus is viable and does not

37. Id. at 871.
38. Id. at 871, 879.

39. Id. at 860.
40. Id. at 877.
41. Id. at 877.
42. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.

43. Id.
44. Id. at 878.
45. Id.
46. "Partial-birth abortion," or "Intact Dilation and Extraction," is a method of terminating a
pregnancy after 16 weeks. ACOG

STATEMENT,
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provide an exception for the health of the pregnant woman.
B. The South CarolinaStatute
Prior to banning partial-birth abortions in 1997, South Carolina criminalized
abortion with three enumerated exceptions. 47 Abortion was legal in the following
circumstances: (1) pursuant to the physician's medical judgment, an attending
physician may terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester with the pregnant
women's consent; (2) a second trimester abortion may only be performed with the
pregnant woman's consent by her attending physician in ahospital or clinic certified
by the Department of Health and Environmental Control; and (3) third trimester
abortions are legal only if performed in a certified hospital after the pregnant
woman and her husband-if she is married and living with him--consents, and only
if the attending physician and a concluding physician certify in writing that the
abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. 8
South Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban makes the performance of a partialbirth abortion a felony.49 Although the statute provides an exception for the life of
the mother, it fails to provide for situations in which the health of the pregnant
woman is at risk." Moreover, the statute makes no distinction between pre-viability
and post-viability. The statute also creates a cause of action for the father and the

maternal grandparents.5 The plaintiff in such a civil action may be entitled to relief

that includes treble actual damages, punitive damages, and reasonable costs and
attorney's fees.5" Interestingly, the pregnant woman is exempt from both civil and
criminal liability for violating the statute.53
C. Existing Case Law RegardingSimilar Statutes
The post-Casey banning of specific abortion procedures is a novel issue in
most, if not all, jurisdictions. No South Carolina state court and no federal courts
in the Fourth Circuit have considered constitutional challenges to statutes banning
partial-birth abortions. However, otherjurisdictions have held that statutes banning

47. S.C. CODEAN. § 44-41-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Under the South Carolina Code, "abortion"
is defined as
the use of an instrument, medicine, drug, or other substance or device with intent
to terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant for reasons other
than to increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the
child after live birth, or to remove a dead fetus.
S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-10(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
48. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-20(a)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
49. S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-85 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
50. Id. § 44-41-85(A).
51. Id. § 44-41-85(C).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 44-41-85(D).
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the partial-birth abortion procedure are unconstitutional.54 For example in Women's
MedicalProfessionalCorp. v. Voinovich,55 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held
unconstitutional an Ohio statute banning the partial-birth abortion procedure.56 The
court found that the standard of review for facial challenges to laws regulating
abortion is whether, in a large fraction of cases in which the law is applicable, the
law operates for a "large fraction of the relevant population" as a substantial
obstacle to a woman's choice to have an abortion. 7 The court found that the
8 is consistent with
Supreme Court's analysis in PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth"
Casey's undue burden standard and provides some guidance in examining the
constitutionality of an abortion procedure. 9 The Sixth Circuit found that the
definition of partial-birth abortion in the Ohio statute encompassed the dilation and

54. See, e.g., Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding
an Ohio ban of the partial-birth abortion procedure unconstitutional), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347
(1998).

55. 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997). The Ohio statute at issue in the case provided that "[n]o person
shall knowingly perform or attempt to perform a dilation and extraction procedure upon a pregnant
woman." OHIOREV. CODEANN. § 2919.15(B) (Anderson Supp. 1997). The statute defines the dilation
and extraction procedure as "the termination of a human pregnancy by purposely inserting a suction
device into the skull of a fetus to remove the brain. 'Dilation and extraction procedure' does not include
either the suction currettage procedure of abortion or the suction aspiration procedure of abortion.'Id.
§ 2919.15(A). Physicians that are prosecuted criminally or sued civilly have an affirmative defense if
the woman's life orhealth is atrisk. Id. § 2919.15(C)(1) (governing criminal actions); OHIOREv.CODE
ANN. § 2307.51(C) (Anderson Supp. 1997) (governing civil actions).
56. Women's Med. ProflCorp., 130 F.3d at 203.
57. Id. at 196. Although the CaseyCourt uses language requiring strict scrutiny of a regulation,
the Court used a "large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is relevant" standard when examining
a facial challenge to the constitutionality of an abortion regulation. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992). As the Sixth Circuit interpreted Casey,a factual showing ofunconstitutional
applications in a substantial percentage of the applicable cases can render a law unconstitutional.
Women's Med. ProflCorp., 130 F.3d at 194. The Casey Court explained that the "proper focus of
constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law
is irrelevant." Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. "The analysis does not end with the [small percentage] ofwomen
upon whom the statute operates; it begins there." Id.
The other possible standard for a facial challenge is governed by United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987). The Salerno standard requires that the challenger prove the absence of any set of
circumstances under which the statute would be valid. Id. at 745. The majority of courts have
determined that the Casey Court replaced this strict standard in the abortion context with the "large
fraction of the relevant population" standard. See, e.g., Women's Med. ProflCorp., 130 F.3d at 194,
196 (holding partial-birth abortion statute unconstitutional under "large fraction of the relevant
population" test established in Casey); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1312 (E.D. Mich. 1997)
(finding the Casey "large fraction" test has replaced the Salerno "no set of circumstances" test); see
also Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding unconstitutional under the
Casey standard a statute that strictly regulated abortion after 20 weeks gestational age).
58. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). In Danforth the Supreme Court held that a Missouri statute banning the
saline amniocentesis abortion procedure was unconstitutional. Id. at 79. The Court reasoned that "as
a practical matter, [the statute] forces a woman and her physician to terminate her pregnancy by
methods more dangerous to her health than the method outlawed." Id.
59. Women's Med. ProflCorp., 130 F.3d at 201.
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evacuation procedure," the most common abortion method in the second trimester.
The court also found that severing the statute into pre-viability and post-viability
was not feasible because the court essentially would have to rewrite the statute to
create a provision that could stand by itself."' Therefore, the court concluded the
entire ban was unconstitutional.62
Likewise, in PlannedParenthoodv. Woods 3 the United States District Court
for the District ofArizona found a similar statute banning the partial-birth abortion
procedure encompassed other second trimester abortion procedures." Accordingly,
the court held that the statute unconstitutionally burdened a woman's right to abort
a nonviable fetus and was unconstitutionally vague' for failing to sufficiently
define the conduct that it attempted to proscribe.6 The court's holding stemmed
from the statute's potential chilling effect on physicians by the vague definition of
partial-birth abortion which may create confusion as to what procedure is actually
proscribed; thus, physicians might refrain from performing any procedure that might
be interpreted as falling within the statute.67 As a result, the pregnant woman may
be left with few, if any, options. 8 Although the statute contained no express
provision requiring consent from the father or maternal grandparents, the court
found that the physician was exposed to civil liability for performing a proscribed
act without obtaining their consent.6 9 In practice, this civil liability portion ofthe act
operated as a spousal consent provision." Finally, because the statute did not
provide a judicial bypass for minors seeking such an abortion, the civil liability

60. Id. Dilation and evacuation is a procedure used in the second trimester when the fetus
becomes too large to remove by use ofsuction curettage. The dilation and evacuation procedure seems
to be preferable to other procedures before week 20 and is the only procedure available between weeks

13 and 16. In the two-day period prior to the procedure, the doctor inserts laminaria into the cervix to
slowly dilate it. During the procedure, a suction curette with a larger diameter is placed through the
cervix, and the doctor removes the fetal tissue. Because the torso and the head frequently cannot be
removed in this manner, the doctor typically must dismember the fetus to remove these parts. To
perform this task, the doctor uses both the suction curettage and the forceps. See Women's Med. Prof'l
Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1064-1065 (S.D. Ohio 1995), affid, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998). Restricting multiple abortion alternatives jeopardizes the
constitutional validity of this statute by placing an undue burden on a woman's choice to terminate her
pregnancy. Id. at 1070.
61. Women's Med. ProflCorp., 130 F.3d at 202.
62. Id.
63. 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997).
64. Id. at 1377.
65. According to the United States Supreme Court, "the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that
a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
66. Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1380.
67. Id. at 1377.
68. Id. at 1378.
69. Id. at 1380.
70. Id.
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provision for the maternal grandparents was also unconstitutional under Casey.7
Similarly, in Evans v. Kelley 2 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan held Michigan's partial-birth abortion ban73 unconstitutional
for vagueness and overbreadth.74 Expert medical testimony provided evidence of the
lack of clarity regarding terms such as "deliver," "partially," and "partial-birth
abortion.""5 The court found that "[b]ecause the statutory definition of the banned
procedure [was] ambiguous and because this language permeate[d] the statute and
liability [was] premised on it, the entire statute [had to] be declared void for
vagueness."76 Moreover, the statutory definition of "partial-birth abortion"
encompassed the dilation and evacuation procedure, the most common and safest
procedure used between weeks thirteen and sixteen.77 In doing so, the statute placed
an undue burden on women seeking to abort a nonviable fetus 7 because the only
procedures left were the hysterotomy79 and the hysterectomy,"0 which carry with
them high risks of complications.8 ' Additionally, when induction, 2 an alternative
available after sixteen weeks, is contraindicated, the only alternatives are
hysterotomy and hysterectomy. 3 The court concluded that leaving women with only

71. Id.
72. 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
73. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17016 (West Supp. 1997). The statute defined a partialbirth abortion as "partially vaginally deliver[ing] a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing
the delivery." Id. § 333.17016(5)(c). The statute provided an exception when "performing the partialbirth abortion is necessary to save the life of a pregnant woman whose life is endangered by a physical

disorder, physical illness, or physical injury and that no other medical procedure will accomplish that
purpose." Id. § 333.17016(2).
74. See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1319 (E.D. Mich. 1997) ("rMhe Michigan partial-birth abortion
statute must be declared unconstitutional and enjoined because, under controlling precedent, it is vague
and overbroad and unconstitutionally imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to seek a previability second trimester abortion .... ."). The Evans court, like the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals,
found that PlannedParenthoodv. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), could be read in conjunction with
Casey.
75. Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1304-11.
76. Id. at 1311.
77. Id. at 1318.
78. Id. at 1319.
79. A "[h]ysterotomy is the transabdominal, surgical removal of the fetus from the uterus prior
to term (i.e., a pre-term caesarean section)."Id. at 1294. The hysterotomy is a major surgical procedure
that carries a high risk of mortality and morbidity. Id.
80. A "[h]ysterectomy entails the removal of the uterus." Id. A hysterectomy ends a woman's
childbearing capability and presents the same high risks of complication as a hysterotomy. Id.
81. Evans,977 F.Supp. at 1317.
82. In one type of instillation procedure, also known as an "induction procedure," the physician
injects a substance, typically saline, into the woman's vagina. This method induces labor, which
generally lasts between six and thirty-six hours. Id. at 1294. The advantages of the induction method
appears to be two-fold: (1) it requires less skill to perform and (2) it does not involve the placement
of sharp instruments into the uterus. Inducement methods should not be performed on women with a
pelvic infection or on women that have had caesarean sections because of the possibility of rupturing
the uterine scar. Id. at 1295.
83. Id. at 1318.
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more hazardous alternatives to the dilation and evacuation procedure "clearly
impose[d] an undue burden on a woman's right to seek a pre-viability abortion. 84
Analogously, in Carhartv. Stenberg"5 the United States District Court for the
District of Nebraskapreliminarily enjoined defendants from enforcing a partial-birth
abortion ban against the plaintiff/doctor regarding his performance of dilation and
extraction abortions on nonviable fetuses. 6 Unlike the cases discussed above,
Carhartdealt with an as-applied challenge. 7 Doctor Carhart convinced the court
that the dilation and extraction procedure he performed was safer than performing
even the dilation and evacuation procedure. 8 Therefore, women facing the abortion
decision were confronted with an undue burden in choosing abortion because the
state required them "to accept an increased risk of death or serious injury which,
though small, is nevertheless real."89 The court, in serving the public interest,
enjoined the statute because it carried "with it real risks to maternal health."9
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTE

The post-Casey history of abortion litigationin the lower courts
is reminiscentof the classic recurringfootball drama of Charlie
Brown and Lucy in the Peanuts comic strip. Lucy repeatedly

84. Id.
85. 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997).
86. Id. at 531.
87. In an "as applied" challenge, the plaintiff seeks to prevent the statute's future application in
a similar situation, but not to render the statute inoperative. Id. at 522. In deeming Carhart's suit an asapplied challenge, the court evaded the need to consider the Salerno quesion. See supra note 57 and
accompanying text.
88. See Carhart,972 F. Supp. at 526. Dr. Carhart evinced four reasons his variation of the intact
dilation and extraction procedure is safer than performing a dilation and evacuation:
1. Intact removal of the fetus reduces the possibility of complications from
the passage of sharp bony fragments through the cervix and is therefore less
traumatic to a woman' cervix and uterus.
2. ... [The intact dilation and extraction] procedure reduces the use of
instruments in the uterus which in turn lessens the risk of complications from
tearing or perforating the uterus with instruments.
3. By using [the intact dilation and extraction] procedure, Carhart prevents
disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC) and amniotic fluid embolus, both
of which are among the most common causes of maternal mortality and
complications.
4. By removing the fetus intact, Carhart reduces the likelihood of retained
fetal parts, which [an expert witness] testified is a "horrible complication."
Id. (citations omitted). DIC is "the absorption into the mother's bloodstream of fetal brain, skin, and

blood tissue through the blood sinuses or cavities inthe uterine wall, thereby causing the mother's own
coagulation factors to stop working." Id at 516. In addition, removal of the intact fetus is quicker than
dismembering it; therefore, the woman has less of a risk of hemorrhage, less total bleeding, and less
risk of infection. Id. at 527.
89. Id. at 530.
90. Id. at 531.
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assured CharlieBrown thathe can kick the football, if only this
time he gets itjust right. Charlie Brown keeps trying, but Lucy
never fails to pull the ball away at the last moment. Here our
court 'sjudgmentis that.., legislators,like poor CharlieBrown,
have fallen flat on their backs. I doubt that the lawyers and
litigantswill ever stop thisgame. Perhapsthe Supreme Courtwill
do so.9'

Although many find the dilation and extraction procedure abhorrent, courts
across the United States are bound to follow the Supreme Court's precedent. As a
result, at least one United States Court of Appeals and several United States District
Courts have found statutes banning partial-birth abortions unconstitutional based
on varying interpretations of the undue burden test set forth in Casey.9 If
challenged, South Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban will face the same
constitutional barriers.93
Because a physician might perform a partial-birth abortion on a woman whose
fetus has not yet reached the stage of viability, 94 the regulation must not place an
undue burden on the woman facing the abortion decision.95 Post-viability
regulations are generally permitted if an exception for the life and health of the
mother is provided.96 South Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban does not
distinguish between pre-viability and post-viability procedures. Severability is
generally an issue of state law; therefore, a United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina may examine the statute as a whole or sever the statute
into two parts, one governing pre-viability and one governing post-viability. 97

91. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 218-19 (6th Cir. 1997) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1347 (1998).
92. See id. at 190; Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); Carhart
v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507 (D. Neb. 1997).
93. South Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban may not face constitutional challenges because
the law poses no threatto physicians performing abortions in the state. South Carolina medical officers
assert that no doctors in the state perform the partial-birth abortion procedure. See Cindi Ross Scoppe,
'Partial-Birth'Abortion Ban SignedintoLaw, THESTATE (Columbia), Mar. 27,1997, atB6. However,
this is incumbentupon a finding that the statute encompasses only the dilation and extraction procedure.
Ifabortion providers and activists in South Carolina fear that the statute encompasses the dilation and
evacuation or the induction methods of abortion, they will likely challenge its validity.
94. Intact dilation and extraction procedures are generally performed after 16 weeks. ACOG
STATEMENT,

supranote 8, at 1.

95. An undue burden is imposed if its purpose or result is to place a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
96. Id. at 879.
97. The Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals found that severing a similar Ohio statute, in effect, would
constitute judicial legislation. Women's Med. Profpl Corp., 130 F.3d at 202 ("We essentially would
have to rewrite the Act in order to create a provision which could stand by itself. This we cannot do.").
In the event the court fails to sever the statute, the entire statute must fall.
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A. South CarolinaStatute As Applied to Nonviable Fetuses
If doctors and the courts interpret the statute to include the dilation and
evacuation procedure, the issue becomes one of choice commingled with safety. If
an abortion statute proscribes multiple procedures, a court likely will find that the
statute places an undue burden on a woman facing the decision of whether or not
to have an abortion, especially when the remaining alternatives are not as safe as the
proscribed procedures.
Doctors that routinely perform late-term abortions might argue that South
Carolina's statutory definition of "partial-birth abortion""3 could feasibly include
the dilation and evacuation procedure and, in some instances, the induction
procedures. 99 Doctors are concerned with the use of the word "delivery" because
obstetricians and gynecologists do not merely use that term to mean "delivering a
full fetus or a full baby."' 0 Thus, courts might interpret the introduction of fetal
parts into the vaginal cavity as violative of the statute because a dilation and
evacuation procedure involves the doctor grasping part of the fetus and pulling it
down, very often introducing an extremity into the vaginal cavity; the extremity is

then dismembered so that hemorrhaging causes the death of the fetus.'"' Doctor
Mark J. Evans believes that a feasible interpretation of the Michigan partial-birth
abortion statute' 2 covers the conventional dilation and extraction procedure.0 3
Moreover, he believes that doctors would risk prosecution for violating the statute
in cases in which they must reduce the calvarium to complete an abortion during an
induction procedure."' 4 Indeed, when a physician attempts to perform an induction
or a conventional dilation and evacuation, that procedure occasionally becomes an
intact dilation and extraction.'05

98. South Carolina defines partial-birth abortion as "an abortion in which the person performing
the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the
delivery." S.C. CODEANN. § 44-41-85(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
99. See Women's Med. Profl Corp., 130 F.3d at 201; Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F.
Supp. 1369, 1378 (D. Ariz. 1997); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1297 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
100. Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1297-98. The court's expert witness agreed that because of the use
of the word "deliver," the statute was not clear to him as a physician. Id. at 1299.
101. Id. at 1298.
102. The Michigan and the South Carolina statutes define "partial-birth abortion" in the same
manner. Compare MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 333.17016(5)(c) fWest Supp. 1997) ("'Partial-birth
abortion' means an abortion in which the physician or individual acting under the delegatory authority
of the physician performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the
fetus and completing the delivery."), with S.C. CoDEANN. § 44-41-85(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)
("'Partial-birth abortion' means an abortion in which the person performing the abortion partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.").
103. See Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1298.
104. Id. The physician reduces the calvarium, or "superior part of the cranium," KEITH MOORE,
CLINICALLY ORIENTED ANATOMY 637 (3d ed. 1992), when the fetal head is stuck and waiting until
dilation is sufficient may be hazardous to the woman's health. Evans, 977 F. Supp. at 1298.
105. Id.Doctor Evans testified that he has begun performing abortions using either a dilation and
evacuation or an induction method; however, as he tried to bring the fetus out, the head sometimes
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Similarly, Dr. Dennis Christensen testified that a partial-birth abortion statute
is susceptible to more than one interpretation because "partially vaginally deliver"
can mean that "either part of the fetus has been removed or the whole fetus has been
partially removed."' 6 Doctor Christensen interpreted the statute to mean that
"anything [a physician does] to terminate[] the signs of life of the fetus when it's
partially out of the woman violates the statute."' 07 In light of these interpretations,
physicians in South Carolina may abstain from performing either the dilation and
evacuation or the induction procedures or both. A court faced with a challenge to
South Carolina's partial-birth abortion statute must determine whether this potential
chilling effect will pose an undue burden on a woman's decision to seek an
abortion.
Both the United States Congress and state legislatures have consulted
physicians regarding the partial-birth abortion procedure, and physicians nationwide
have debated the risks and advantages of the partial-birth abortion procedure. In
January of 1997, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
stated that a select panel could not identify any circumstances under which an intact
dilation and extraction would be the only option available to save the life or
preserve the health of the pregnant woman.'08 However, the ACOG maintained that
the procedure may be the best or most appropriate abortion method in certain
situations, and so the decision is best left to the doctor."° Conversely, the American
Medical Association (AMA) has rejected this type of procedure and supports
restricting the intact dilation and extraction method because safer abortion
alternatives are available."0 P. John Seward, the Executive Vice President of the
AMA, stated that the partial delivery of a living fetus for the purpose of killing it
outside of the womb ought to be strictly limited."' Moreover, although the AMA
believes physicians should have broad discretion in medical matters, the state can
and should regulate this procedure if the profession refuses."'
As with every other issue involving abortion, arguments are advanced regarding

becomes stuck. In those situations, he reduces the calvarium to extract the fetus. Id. at 1299.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. ACOG STATEMENT, supranote 8, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Letter from P. John Seward, M.D., AMA Executive Vice President, to Letters to the Editor,
The New York Times (May 30, 1997), availablein AMA Advocacy and CommunicationsLetter to The
New York Times Regarding AMA Support of H.R. 1122 (visited June 18, 1998) <http://amaassn.org/ad-com/releases/1997/nytO530.htm>. House bill 1122 was vetoed by President Clinton on
October 10, 1997. See supratext accompanying note 10.
111. Letter from P. John Seward, supra note 110.
112. Id. Even the executive director of the National Coalition of Abortion Providers, Ron
Fitzsimmons, said that he did not want to spend his political capital to defend this procedure, which has
little popular support. Besides, the ban would have almost no real-world impact on late-term abortion
providers or women that seek them. Doctors would use alternative abortion methods and continue to
see the same patients. Diane M. Gianelli, Abortion Rights Leader Urges End to "Half Truths,"
AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS: SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 3, 1997.
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the safety of the intact dilation and extraction by both pro-choice and pro-life
groups. Some abortion providers claim that the partial-birth abortion procedure is
a better procedure to preserve the woman's future fertility because it avoids the use
of sharp instrumentation and bone tears."' These providers believe that the
procedure gives women that use it because of unexpected fetal anomalies the
opportunity to have a baby later." 4 In Carhartv. Stenberg the trial court found
several additional reasons why at least one variation of the intact dilation and
extraction procedure is safer than performing dilation and evacuation. First, the
intact dilation and extraction method reduces the use of instruments in the uterus,
lessening the risk ofcomplications from tearing or perforating the uterus.11 Second,
use of the intact dilation and extraction procedure prevents disseminated
intravascular coagulopathy (DIC)." 6 In addition, the removal of the intact fetus
reduces the likelihood of retained fetal parts."7 Finally, removal of the intact fetus
is quicker than dismembering it; therefore, the woman has "less risk of hemorrhage,
' 18
less total bleeding, and less risk of infection.""
On the other hand, opponents of partial-birth abortion contend the procedure
is potentially dangerous and is inadvisable for fertility enhancement." 9 Critics also
claim that turning the fetus to a breech position can cause amniotic fluid
embolism,' 20 placental abruption.. or uterine rupture.'" Additionally, the forcible
dilation necessary for the procedure risks creating an "incompetent cervix,"u which
24
could prevent the woman from carrying future pregnancies to term.
If a court finds that alternative methods of abortion during pre-viability are
more dangerous to a woman's life or health than the dilation and extraction
procedure, it likely will hold South Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban

113. Diane M. Gianelli, ACOG Draws Firefor Saying Procedure "May" Be Best Optionfor
Some, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS: SPECIAL REPORT, Mar. 3, 1997.
114. Id.
115. Carhart v. Stenberg, 972 F. Supp. 507, 526 (D. Neb. 1997).
116. See id; see also supranote 88.
117. See Carhart,972 F. Supp. at 526.
118. Id. at 527.
119. Gianelli, supranote 112. Opponents of the procedure also note that one of the five women
at President Clinton's 1996 veto ceremony had five miscarriages after her partial-birth abortion.
120. An embolism is "a defect in which a clot (embolus) travels through the bloodstream and
becomes lodged in a blood vessel, usually in the heart, lungs, or brain." THE MOSBY MEDICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA 253 (Walter D. Glanze ed., 1985).
121. Abruptio placentae is the "parting of the placenta from the uterus before birth," which is
serious because it often results in severe bleeding. Id. at 3.
122. A uterine rupture is a "tear or break" in the uterus. See id. at 651; see also Gianelli, supra
note 112.
123. An incompetent cervix is "a condition marked by opening of the mouth of the uterus before
[a pregnancy comes to] term without labor or contractions of the uterus." Possible results are
miscarriage or premature delivery. The condition is "treated by a procedure in which the uterus is held
closed by a surgically implanted suture." THEMOSBYMEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 253 (WalterD. Glanze
ed., 1985).
124. Gianelli, supranote 112.
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unconstitutional because it burdens a woman's right to a pre-viability abortion.
Moreover, even without such a finding, restricting multiple abortion alternatives,
expressly or because of the chilling effect of vague terminology, jeopardizes the
constitutional validity of this statute by placing an undue burden on a woman's
choice to terminate her pregnancy.
B. South Carolina'sPartial-BirthAbortionBan asApplied to Viable Fetuses
At the point of viability, the State may proscribe abortions completely if the
legislation provides for the health and safety of the woman."z South Carolina's
partial-birth abortion statute provides an exception to proscription of the procedure,
which allows it if necessary to save the life of the mother.'26 However, the statute
does not provide an exception when the health of the pregnant woman is at risk.
Casey clearly holds that the State may not hinder a woman's choice to have an
abortion if continuing her pregnancy would threaten her health. 27 To ensure the
validity of this statute, the South Carolina General Assembly should amend the
statute to provide an exception when the mother's health is at risk. Without this
exception, South Carolina does not have the power to restrict a post-viability
abortion procedure.
V. CONCLUSION

South Carolina's partial-birth abortion ban is unconstitutional because it places
an undue burden on a woman's reproductive decision by failing to define clearly the
proscribed procedure and by eliminating multiple alternative procedures. These
problems arise because of the vagueness of the term "partial-birth abortion." As a
result of this vagueness, physicians may refrain from performing many procedures
out of an abundance of caution. To avoid constitutional challenge to the statute, the

South Carolina General Assembly should substitute the descriptive term "partialbirth abortion" with the proper medical term "intact dilation and evacuation" or use
both terms in the statute.
Elizabeth A. Cooke

125. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
126. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) ("This section shall not apply
to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, a physical illness, or a physical injury if no other medical procedure would suffice
for that purpose.").
127. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; see also Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369,
1380 (D. Ariz. 1997) (holding that partial-birth abortion statute unconstitutionally burdened woman's
right to abortion and was void for vagueness).
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FEDERAL-STATE PREEMPTION AND THE SOUTH
CAROLINA CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE
I.

INTRODUCTION

On February 18, 1998, the South Carolina House of Representatives passed a
bill that would ban preferential treatment for women and minorities in public
employment, public education, and public contracting.' This Article explores

whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 would preempt the provision in
the 1997 version ofthis bill, H.R. 3132,' and the identical provision in the 1998 bill,
H.R. 4115,' that would ban preferential treatment of minorities and women in

public employment.' Because ofthe similarity between South Carolina's proposed
statutory amendment and a recently enacted California constitutional amendment,6
this Article examines the federal district court opinion 7 and Ninth Circuit opinion8
arising out of a challenge to the California amendment and compares these opinions
with United States Supreme Court precedent. 9 Ultimately, this Article concludes
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would not preempt the South Carolina
Civil Rights Initiative.

1. See Jesse J. Holland, House Votes to EndAffirmativeAction: Bill WouldEndPracticein State
Government, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 19, 1998, at B3; see also H.R. 4115, 112th Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1998), available in <http://www.lpitr.state.sc.us/bills/4115.htm>. On
February 19, 1998, the bill was introduced on the Senate floor, read for the first time, and referred to
the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it died without further action. Id.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). This section makes discrimination against minorities and
women an unlawful employment practice. Id.
3. H.R. 3132, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997), available in
<http://www.lpitr.state.sc.us/bills/3132.htm>.
4. H.R. 4115, 112th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1998), availablein
<http://www.lpitr.state.sc.us/bills/4115.htm>.
5. Opponents ofasimilar amendment in California, California Proposition 209,1996 Cal. Legis.
Serv. Prop. 209 (West), also argued that banning preferential treatment denies women and racial
minorities equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
conflicts with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of
1972. As a result, opponents argued that the California amendment was void under the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F.
Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), stay denied, No. A-174, 1997 WL 70641 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 1997),
vacatedby 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir.), andopinion amended and supersededon denial ofreh'gby 122
F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), and stay denied, 122 F.3d 718 (9th Cir.), stay denied, 118 S. Ct. 17, and cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
6. See CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 31. Proposition 209 was approved on November 5, 1996. 1996 Cal.
Legis. Serv. Prop. 209 (West).
7. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480.
8. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397
(1997).
9. See California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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II. BACKGROUND

The Civil Rights Initiative was first introduced in the House of Representatives
as an amendment to Article XVII of the South Carolina Constitution on January 8,
1997.10 After House Judiciary Committee discussion, the resolution was recast as
a statutory amendment to Title 1, Chapter 13, of the South Carolina Code." The
1997 amendment proposed by the Judiciary Committee would have added the
following to the Code of Laws of South Carolina:

Neither the State of South Carolina nor any of its political subdivisions
shall use race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for
either discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to any
individual or group in the operation of the state's system of public
employment public education, or public contracting. 2
A. Affirmative Action and the South CarolinaHumanAffairs Commission
The South Carolina Human Affairs Commission is charged with the duty of
ensuring State agency compliance with Title VII.V 3' The Commission requires state
agencies with fifteen or more employees to implement a plan to correct any past
systemic discrimination against women and minorities if evidence of such past
discrimination can be shown by statistical evidence. 4 The Commission adheres to

10. Legislative Information Systems, Final Digest of 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., at 14
(1997).
11. See LPITR, Bill 3132 (visited June 8, 1998) <http://www.lpitr.state.sc.us/bills/3132.htm>.
12. H.R. 3132, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997), availablein
<http://www.lpitr.state.sc.us/bills/3132.htm>. The following exceptions were allowed:
sex
classifications "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the state's system of public
employment or public education;" court orders or consent decrees currently in force; court orders
requiring discrimination to remedy the effects ofa public agency's past practices; and a "bona fide state
agency" monitoring and implementing state laws regarding equal employment opportunity. Id. For the
exceptions to the 1998 version of the bill, see H.R. 4115, 112th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1998),
available in <http://wvv.lpitr.state.sc.us/bills/4115.htm>.
13. See S.C. CODEANN. § 1-13-70(k) (Law. Co-op. 1986). Title VII prohibits an employer from
discriminating against an individual on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994). This prohibition was made applicable to the state and their political
subdivisions by section 2 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)
(1994). The Supreme Court upheld the Act's application to the states in Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976).
14. Telephone Interview with Paul Beazley, Deputy Commissioner, South Carolina Human
Affairs Commission (Oct. 3, 1997); see also SOUTH CAROLINA HuMAN ArrAius COMM'N, THE
BLuEPRINT, at 1-13 to 1-63 (1983) [hereinafter THE BLUEpRINT]. If an agency is within ninety percent
of matching the percentage of minorities and women available for those jobs, that agency is exempt
from the Human Affairs Commission's requirements. Telephone Interview with Paul Beazley, supra.
Currently, seventy-five state agencies are under the scrutiny of the Human Affairs Commission and
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the theory that, if pure chance operated, the percentages of minorities and women
actually employed by state agencies would approximately match the percentages of
minorities and women available in the work force.' 5 Consequently, if a disparity
discrimination, and affirmative action is required
exists, it evidences past systemic
6
result.1
this
to counteract
The Commission requires each state agency to conduct a three-step inquiry to
determine whether an affirmative action plan must be adopted.' 7 First, an agency
must conduct a work force analysis to determine how many people are employed
by the agency and in what capacity they are employed.' 8 Next, the agency must
divide jobs into categories based upon similarities in work performed and salaries
paid.' 9 Finally, the agency must determine the number of people qualified to
perform these jobs in the geographical region and group them according to race and
sex.2" If a significant disparity exists between the percentage of qualified workers
in a certain class and the percentage of the agency's employees in the class,2' the
Commission requires the agency to set goals designed to gradually reduce and
eventually eliminate the disparity through the use of affirmative action.22 When a
job opens in an agency, and the candidates that fulfill the objective criteria required
for the job are essentially equally qualified, the agency is encouraged to select a
woman or minority to fill the position so that the goals of the affirmative action plan
are promoted.2 Thus, the affirmative action scheme does not encourage preferential
treatment until the final step in the hiring process.
The Commission believes that the affirmative action activities it requires of
state agencies under its direction satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis of the United
States Supreme Court and are therefore constitutionally valid.24 The Court requires
employment decisions favoring minorities and women to be made pursuant to an
affirmative action plan that is "designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance
in traditionally segregated job categories." 25 The plan cannot "unnecessarily
trammel-]" 26 the rights of non-minority employees and applicants or create an
"absolute bar"'2 to their hiring or advancement. The program must be "narrowly

twelve agencies are exempt from affirmative action requirements because of substantial conformity
with the percentages of minorities and women in the relevant labor pool. Id.
15. Telephone Interview with Paul Beazley, supranote 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. THE BLUEPRINT, supranote 14, at 1-13 to 1-22.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Carolina
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1-22 to 1-33.
Id. at 1-33 to 1-49.
Id. at 1-55.
Id. at 1-60.
Telephone Interview with Paul Beazley, supra note 14.
Telephone Interview with Mary Sneed, Director of Technical Services and Training, South
Human Affairs Commission (Oct. 3, 1997).
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193, 209 (1979).
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 637 (1987).
Id. at 637-38.
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tailored [and] necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion" by a
particular agency.28 Finally, an agency must find "strong" or "convincing" evidence
of prior discrimination by that agency before enacting such a plan.2 9
B. The PotentialEffect ofthe Civil Rights Initiative on the Affirmative Action
Employment Programsofthe South CarolinaHumanAffairs Commission
The Civil Rights Initiative would invalidate only the final step of the
Commission's affirmative action employment program. This step encourages
preferential treatment of women and minorities during the hiring process if the
qualifications of all job applicants are essentially equal." Hunter Limbaugh, now
Chief Legal Counsel to the Governor, originally sponsored H.R. 3132. Limbaugh
added the language contained in sub-paragraph (H) to allay the Commission's
concern that the legislation is aimed at rendering the Commission's activities
nugatory.3' Sub-paragraph (H) states that "[n]othing in this section shall be
interpreted to prohibit a bona fide state agency from its responsibilities to monitor
and implement state laws assuring equal employment opportunity to all persons."32
The Commission seems to view sub-paragraph (H) as exempting all of its current

affirmative action activities from the prohibition against preferential treatment
contained in the bill.33 If the Commission's view is correct, the Civil Rights
Initiative would be rendered practically ineffectual and reduced to a mere statement
of political sentiment.
However, in Limbaugh's view, sub-paragraph (H) does not alter the substance
ofthe amendment.34 According to Limbaugh, the legislation still would prohibit the
preferential treatment step in the affirmative action scheme implemented by the
South Carolina Human Affairs Commission because nothing in the Commission's
authorization statutes requires or specifically authorizes preferential treatment of
women and minorities.35 If the Civil Rights Initiative is passed, the mission of the
Human Affairs Commission will not change; the Commission will, however, have
to use alternative methods to achieve its goals.36
The Commission and Limbaugh appear to be in conflict concerning the
characterization of the final portion of the Commission's affirmative action plan.

28. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
29. United Black Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1011 (6th Cir. 1992).
30. See supranote 23 and accompanying text.
31. Telephone Interview with Paul Beazley, supranote 14.
32. H.R. 3132, 112th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (S.C. 1997), availablein
<http://www.lpitr.state.sc.uslbills/3132.htm>.
33. Telephone Interview with Paul Beazley, supra note 14.
34. Telephone Interview with Hunter Limbaugh, Chief Legal Counsel to Governor Beasley (Oct.
17, 1997).
35. Id.

36. Id.
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The Commission views the step as a "leveling of the playing field, 37 and therefore
not within the language of the amendment. Conversely, Limbaugh feels that the step
is "preferential treatment, '38 and thus prohibited by the amendment. 9 Ifthe proposal
is passed, the courts will be called upon to decide the issue.
C. Federal Decisions Regarding Preemption of Amendments That Ban
PreferentialTreatment
To date, California is the only state that has enacted a law that bans preferential
treatment by state agencies in the hiring process.40 Because of the similarity between
the California and the South Carolina amendments,4 the future of South Carolina's
Civil Rights Initiative, if it is enacted, may depend to a large extent on the success
or failure of the California amendment in the federal courts.
Immediately after its passage, the California amendment was challenged in
federal court. The complaint alleged that the amendment denies women and racial
minorities equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and conflicts with
Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972, therefore making the amendment void under the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution.42 Specifically, the Title VII
argument focused on whether § 2000e and sequential provisions preempted
California's constitutional amendment.43 Judge Thelton E. Henderson of the
Northern District of California found merit in the equal protection and Title VII
preemption arguments and granted a preliminary injunction on December 23,
1996." The court enjoined the State of California "from implementing or enforcing
Proposition 209 insofar as said amendment ... purports to prohibit or affect
affirmative action programs. ' 4
On April 8, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated the preliminary injunction in a strongly worded opinion, thus allowing

37. Telephone Interview with Paul Beazley, supra note 14.
38. Telephone Interview with Hunter Limbaugh, supranote 34.
39. This conflict goes to the heart of the nature of affirmative action programs.
40. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31.
41. Compare CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 31 ("The state shall not discriminate against, or grant
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation ofpublic employment, public education or public contracting"), with H.R. 3132,
112th Gen.Assembly, Ist Sess. (S.C. 1997),availablein<http:llwww.lpitr.state.sc.uslbills/3132.htm>
('Neither the State of South Carolina nor any of its political subdivisions shall use race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin as a criterion for either discriminating against or granting preferential
treatment to any individual or group in the operation ofthe state's system ofpublic employment, public
education, or public contracting.").
42. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1489-90 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated
by 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
43. Id. at 1512.
44. Id. at 1520.
45. Id. at 1520.
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Proposition 209 to be implemented.46 Judge O'Scannlain, writing for a unanimous
three-judge panel, stated that "[a]s a matter of 'conventional' equal protection
analysis, there is simply no doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional." ' As for
the preemption argument, the court found that the plain language of Title VII did
not specifically preempt the state amendment and therefore did not render
Proposition 209 invalid under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.4 s
An emergency appeal was sent to Justice O'Connor of the United States
Supreme Court, who referred the stay application to the full Court.49 The Court
refused to reinstate the stay while studying the application," and on November 3,
1997, the Court denied certiorari without further comment."' This Court action does
not, of course, set a precedent ofany sort, but merely postpones final determination
of constitutional issues until another challerige to Proposition 209 is raised.
III. THE PREEMPTION ARGUMENT
A. Federal-StatePreemption: The Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States
Constitution provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the
Land." 2 Three scenarios trigger federal preemption of state law. First, preemption
occurs when a state law conflicts with a federal law. 3 This can occur when it is
impossible to simultaneously comply with both a federal and a state law, 4 or when
the state law is "'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objective of Congress."'' s The second scenario involves those areas
of the law in which Congress has expressed an intent to occupy the entire field.56
If specific language indicating Congress's intent to occupy the field is not included
in the statute, the Supreme Court has held that preemption will be found only when

46. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1448 (9th Cir.), opinion amended and
supersededon denial ofreh'g by 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
47. Id. at 1439.
48. Id. at 1448. The Ninth Circuit's opinion was subsequently republished when the court denied
the petition for rehearing and the suggestion for rehearing en banc. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 118 S.Ct. 397 (1997). The order denying rehearing and
rehearing en bane was published with the dissents from the order. Id. at 711-18. All subsequent
citations to the Ninth Circuit's opinion are to this republished opinion.
49. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 17 (1997) (mem.).
50. Id.
51. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997) (mem.).
2.
52. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.

53. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990).
54. See FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,142-43 (1963) (noting that
when a conflict exists, congressional design is irrelevant).

55. English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
56. Id.
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there is an unmistakable intent or when "the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion.""7 The third situation occurs when Congress expressly
states that a federal law preempts state law. 8
B. The Argumentfor Preemption in the District Court
The two federal court opinions addressing Califomia Proposition 209 illuminate
the approaches to preemption with regard to Title VII. In the district court, Chief
Judge Thelton E. Henderson ruled in favor of the plaintiff's argument concerning
Title VII preemption. 9 Finding no direct conflict between the state and federal law'
and no congressional intent to occupy the field,6 the court turned to obstacle
preemption,' which itdefined as federal preemption of state law when the state law
"""stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."""' .63 The district court looked beyond the plain
language of the statute for the Congressional purpose behind the legislation' and
the means Congress chose to effectuate its purposes to determine if the state law
would interfere with Congress's intended operation of the federal law.65
The court framed the issue in terms of whether Congress intended to preserve

an option for employers to use voluntary affirmative action under Title VII.' The
court first examined the language of section 2000e-2(j) of Title 42 of the United
States Code,67 the only section of Title VII that addresses the issue of preferential

57. FloridaLime & Avocado Growers,Inc., 373 U.S. at 142.
58. English, 496 U.S. at 78-79.
59. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1520 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacatedby
122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997). Section 2000h-4 states that "[nlothing
contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress to
occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject
matter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1994).
60. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1512.
61. Id. at 1511.
62. Id. at 1513-17.
63. Id.at 1511 (quoting International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987) (quoting
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)))).
64. Id. at 1513.
65. Id. at 1516.
66. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1513.
67. Section 2000e-2(j) provides that
[n]othing contained in this subehapter shall be interpreted to require any employer
...subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin employed by any employer ... in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work
force in any community, State, section, or other area.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

83

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 7
1066

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1059

treatment. Finding the statute silent as to whether Congress intended to preserve the
affirmative action option, Judge Henderson turned to the guidelines of the
administrative agency responsible for enforcing Title VII, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).68
The relevant EEOC guideline states that "[v]oluntary affirmative action to
improve opportunities for minorities and women must be encouraged and protected
in order to carry out the Congressional intent embodied in title VII."'69 From this
language, and from the reasons underlying the EEOC's guidelines, 0 the court
determined that "Congress intended to safeguard the discretion to employ voluntary
race- and gender-conscious affirmative action as a means to allow 'flexibility in
71
modifying employment systems to comport with the purposes of Title VII."'
As the final step in its preemption analysis, the district court cited Supreme
Court authority for the proposition that "[a] court must give substantial deference
to all enforcing agency's reasonable explications of a statute."'72 Judge Henderson
found that the EEOC guideline "surpasses the standard of reasonableness,"73
because "[tihe EEOC rationale is consistent with court decisions [which] have
found that permitting voluntary compliance is integral to the purposes of Title
VII."'74 Based on the EEOC guidelines, the district court held that Congress
intended to preserve discretion for employers to utilize voluntary affirmative
action.7" As a result, Title VII was held to preempt California Proposition 209 to the
extent that it bans the use of preferential treatment to women and minorities as part
of an affirmative action plan.76
In response to the defendants' contention that California was merely exercising
an employer's discretion not to use affirmative action, the court found that the State
of California should not exercise discretion on behalf of all state, local, and
municipal employers, but should allow each individual employer the option of
pursuing its own affirmative action plan within constitutional constraints. 7 In
support of that view, the court pointed out that "Congress intended that the
discretion to use race- and gender-conscious preferences be exercised [at the]
employer level., 78 The State of California does not qualify as an employer in this

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).

68. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994).

69. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1997).
70. The guidelines were written to counter "[a]ny uncertainty as to the meaning and application
of title VII [because uncertainty] threatens the accomplishment of the clear Congressional intent to
encourage voluntary affirmative action." Id.
71. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1514 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(c) (1997)).
72. Id. at 1514.
73. Id. at 1515.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1516.
76. Id. at 1517.
77. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 946 F. Supp. at 1517.
78. Id. at 1516.
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context because it is not subjectto employer liability for every discriminatory action

against all local, state, and municipal employees.79 In summary, the district court

found that Proposition 209 removed from public employers in California the option

of using race- and gender-conscious preferences in their hiring practices, an option
that EEOC guidelines suggest Congress intended to preserve. These guidelines were
appropriate for the court to consult because Title VII is silent on this issue.
Therefore, Title VII was found to preempt that portion of Proposition 209 that
banned the use of preferential treatment in public employment."
C. The Ninth Circuit'sArgument Against Preemption
In a unanimous opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit8 held that § 2000e and sequential provisions of Title VII ofthe Civil Rights
Act of 1964 did not preempt Proposition 209's ban on preferential treatment in
public employment.82 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's definition
of obstacle preemption.83 However, the Ninth Circuit found that, because of the
express preemption provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the district court's
obstacle preemption analysis was not appropriate.84 The district court erred in
looking to other sources, such as the EEOC guidelines, for an explanation of
Congressional intent because the plain language of § 2000e-785 clearly delineates
when state laws will be preempted by the Act.86 In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the
general preemption clause contained in § 2000h-4 of Title X187 is subject to the
79. Id. at 1517 (emphasizing that affirmative action measures offer employers a "safe passage
to compliance with Title VII" requirements).
80. Id. at 1520.
81. Circuit Judges O'Scannlain, Leavy, and Kleinfeld sitting in the panel.
82. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir.), cert.denied, 118 S.
Ct. 397 (1997).
83. Id. at 709.
84. Id. at710.
85. Section 2000e-7 states that
[n]othing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law
of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-7 (1994).
86. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 710 ("Congress has indicated [in the 1964 Civil
Rights Act] thatstate laws will be pre-empted only ifthey actually conflictwith federal lax. ' (quoting
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987))),
87. Section 2000h-4 states that
[n]othing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates
to the exclusion of State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision
of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of State law unless such
provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this Act, or any provision
thereof.
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more specific purposes and provisions set out in the Act itself.88 Thus, because
Congress included a specific preemption clause within Title VII, § 2000e-789 takes
precedence.
After analyzing the language of § 2000e-7, the court of appeals concluded that,
in the context of Title VII, Congress only intended to preempt state laws that are in
direct conflict with Title VII.9 Section 2000e-2(j) is the only provision of Title VII
that refers to preferential treatment.' The court found that no direct conflict existed
between the federal and state statutes at issue; indeed, the California Constitutional
Amendment was "entirely consistent" with the purposes of Title VII.93
Finally, the court of appeals agreed with the defendants' argument that, even
if the preservation of affirmative action were determined to be an objective of
Congress, California's enforcement ofProposition 209 is merely a state exercising
its right as an employer to choose not to use affirmative action.94
IV. THE PREEMPTION ARGUMENT: APPLICATION TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL
RIGHTS INITIATIVE
A. FieldPreemption
Title VII does not preempt the South Carolina Civil Rights Initiative by field
preemption. The district court and Ninth Circuit opinions addressing California
Proposition 209 agree that Congress did not intend to occupy the field of
discrimination and employment law.9" Congress's intent, or lack of intent, is clearly
stated in section § 2000h-4 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.96 Thus, it is clear from the
express language of the statute that no field preemption exists.

42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1994).
88. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 710.
89. See supranote 85 and accompanying text.
90. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 710.
91. Id.
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20) (1994); see supra note 67.
93. Coalitionfor Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 710 ("'[D]iscriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."' (quoting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))).
94. Id. at 710 ("Nothing in Title VII suggests that Congress intended to leave government with
less latitude under Title VII than private employers.").
95. See id. at 709 n.20 ("Plaintiffs raise no claim offield pre-emption, which, as the district court
noted, does not apply."); Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1511 (N.D. Cal.
1996) ("Plaintiffs raise no preemption claim and Congress plainly did not intend to 'fill the field' of
employment anti-discrimination law when it enacted Title VII."), vacated by 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 397 (1997).
96. See supranote 87 and accompanying text.
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B. Preemption: Direct Conflict
The South Carolina Civil Rights Initiative does not directly conflict with Title
VII. As discussed above, the courts that considered the California amendment agree
that no direct conflict exists between the California amendment and the relevant
provisions of Title VII. Section 2000e-2(j) is the only provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that addresses preferential treatment.97 Section 2000e-2(j) provides that
employers are not requiredtoutilize preferential treatment in an affirmative action
plan.98 Nowhere does the Civil Rights Act specifically authorize, much less require,
preferential treatment for women and minorities. Therefore, no direct conflict exists
between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the South Carolina Civil Rights Initiative.
C. Preemption: Conflicting Objectives
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains two sections concerning preemption on
the basis of conflicting objectives: § 2000h-4 and § 2000e-7. Section 2000h-4
applies to all titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title VII. 9 However,
Congress also included an additional preemption provision in Title VII that differs
significantly from section 2000h-4. °° Under normal principles of statutory
construction, when two provisions are applicable to an issue of law, the more
specific provision must govern over the more broad provision.' 0' Accordingly,
because the preemption clause in Title VII is narrower in scope than the Title XI
clause, the preemption policy of Title VII must govem.'0 2
The Supreme Court has observed that sections 2000e-7 and 2000h-4 "severely
limit Title ViI's preemptive effect."'0 3 Finding support in Shaw v. DeltaAir Lines,
Inc.,"°4 legislative history, 'Os and the remarks of Representative Meader, one of the
sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"° the Court in Guerraexpressed the view
that Congress inserted these narrow preemption provisions to indicate the great

importance of preserving the right of the states to pass and enforce anti-

97. See supranote 67.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).

99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1994).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994).
101. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980) ("[A] more specific statute will be given
precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence.").
102. Henry H. Drummonds, The SisterSovereign States: Preemptionand the Second Twentieth
Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 540 (1993).
103. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987).
104. 463 U.S. 85, 103 n.24 (1983) ("'Title VII did not create new authority for state anitdiscrimination laws; it simply left them where they were before the enactment of Title VII."' (quoting
Pervel Indus., Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 468 F. Supp. 490,493
(D. Conn. 1978))).
105. Guerra,479 U.S. at283 n.14 (quoting S. REP.No.95-331, at 3 n.1 (1977) ("[T]itle VII does
not pre-empt State laws which would not require violating title VII.")).
106. 110 CONG. REc. 2788 (1964) (remarks of Rep. George Meader).
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discrimination laws "in achieving Title VII's goal of equal employment
opportunity."' 7 Accordingly, the Court noted that "state laws will be preempted [by
Title VII] only if they actually conflict with federal law.' ' 8
The argument against preemption is further supported by the views of Professor
Henry H. Drummonds.'0 Professor Drummonds asserts that a "clear and manifest"
explication of the intent of Congress to preempt state law is required to surmount
the presumption against preemption."' Because Congress did not express an intent
to prevent states from banning preferential treatment, the presumption lies in favor
of the validity of the state law. Therefore, Title VII should not preempt the South
Carolina Civil Rights Initiative or California Proposition 209.
The argument surrounding Federal-State preemption in Title VII can also be
seen as an argument over whether Title VII limits a state's ability to remedy
discrimination by setting a minimum standard for discrimination laws below which
states are not permitted to fall, or a maximum standard beyond which states are not
permitted to rise."' A ban on preferential treatment, if not merely a restatement of
Title VII's ban on discrimination, sets a higher standard against discrimination than
Title VII." 2 Granting a state the authority to exceed the minimum standards of Title
VII is in keeping with "a long tradition of state and local police power regulation
of the employment relationship..'. Following this line ofreasoning, South Carolina
is exercising its prerogative under the traditional view of state and local control of
employment law by enacting the Civil Rights Initiative because this amendment
matches or exceeds the minimum standards for employment discrimination found
in Title VII.
V. CONCLUSION
Title VII would not preempt the ban on preferential treatment on the basis of
race or sex found in South Carolina's Civil Rights Initiative, H.R. 3132, under any
of the preemption analyses--conflict, field, or obstacle. The Ninth Circuit and the
United States Supreme Court agree that the two specific preemption provisions
applicable to Title VII provide for Federal-State preemption only in the case of
direct conflict. Because no direct conflict exists, the proposed South Carolina Civil
Rights Initiative would likely survive a federal court challenge on grounds of
preemption by Title VII.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed Title VII preemption of a state
107. Guerra,479 U.S. at 283.
108. Id. at 281.
109. Drummonds, supranote 102, at 541.
110. Id. at 540.
111. Drummonds, supra note 102, at 541 ("Congress repeatedly rejected the notion that federal
employment standards were maximum rather than minimum standards.").
112. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 n.18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 397 (1997).
113. Drummonds, supranote 102, at 541.
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law that bans preferential treatment of women and minorities, the Court has been
moving towards a more restrictive position on affirmative action under its equal
protection analysis." 4 Perhaps, given this weakening support for affirmative action,
the Court might seize the opportunity presented by the South Carolina Civil Rights
Initiative, the California constitutional amendment, and any other similar state law
banning the preferential treatment of women and minorities, to finally bring an end
to affirmative action. These state laws are not preempted by Title VII, but rather are
fully in line with Title VII's objective of ending any form of discrimination in
public employment.
PaulMacPhail

114. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) (applying a strict
scrutiny standard in striking down a minority set-aside program); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding that all racial classifications by a government actor must
be "narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests").
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